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Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35 
DEBORAH L. BRAKE* & JOANNA L. GROSSMAN** 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) with a 
specific purpose in mind—to override the Supreme Court’s refusal in a 1976 case 
to see pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.1  
The Act consists of two clauses.  The first defines sex discrimination to include 
discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions.”2  A second clause directs employers to treat pregnant workers the 
same as other employees with a similar “ability or inability to work.”3  The PDA 
brought about some immediate and significant changes in employer policies 
relating to hiring, firing, and benefits.4  In a series of decisions interpreting the 
PDA, the Supreme Court has bolstered the Act’s force with broad interpretations 
tailored to its underlying purposes.5  But the PDA turns thirty-five this year, and 
with its advancing age have come complications.  Judicial complications. 
Over time, as interpreted by the lower courts, the PDA has withered in 
scope and come to embody the same narrow view of pregnancy discrimination 
that drove the notorious Supreme Court decisions that led to its enactment in the 
first place.  In recent decisions, lower federal courts have taken a stilted view of 
the definition of pregnancy and the meaning of discrimination, to the detriment 
of women generally, but especially working class and lower-income women.  In 
so doing, the courts have misread the statute and reinforced the very gender 
ideology surrounding work and maternity that the Act was intended to dislodge. 
The PDA case law has been burdened by some of the same pitfalls that have 
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 1. The Supreme Court took this position on Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 140 (1976), which adopted the reasoning of its earlier decision taking a similar position on the 
relationship between pregnancy discrimination and sex discrimination under the equal protection 
clause.  See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 2. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. On the effects of the PDA, see generally Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise 
of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567 (2010). 
 5. See text accompanying notes 64-94 infra. 
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cut short the reach of discrimination law generally: a resistance to 
“bootstrapping,” a hostility toward accommodation mandates, and a narrow 
view of discrimination as conscious animus against the protected group.  While 
not limited to the PDA, the emergence of these themes in PDA cases is jarring 
given the distinctive language of the Act.  Running counter to the plain text of 
the Act, the restrictive lower court decisions are animated by stereotypical 
gender ideologies about pregnancy and maternity in relation to paid work. 
This article takes a comprehensive look at recent case law under the PDA, 
while offering a critical commentary on the gender ideology that lies behind 
these decisions and charting the stakes for women in a reinvigorated Act.  The 
survey of PDA decisions is an important undertaking in its own right, since it is 
not widely appreciated just how much courts have narrowed the PDA’s 
protections.  The PDA cases are an increasingly sorry lot, including cases like the 
recent Fourth Circuit ruling in Young v. UPS, in which the court held that a 
pregnant woman could lawfully be denied a light-duty assignment necessitated 
by a medical restriction on lifting even though the company made such 
accommodations for on-the-job injuries, for disabilities entitled to 
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and for 
conditions, medical or otherwise, leading to the loss of driving certification.6  As 
this article explains, the recent expansion of the ADA, which should redound to 
the benefit of PDA plaintiffs by increasing the pool of comparators, has ironically 
made matters worse.7 
From recent successes confronting the “maternal wall,” one might get the 
impression that pregnancy discrimination is a thing of the past or that the law 
adequately responds to it.8  But the maternal wall—the barriers to employment 
equality faced by mothers—begins with pregnancy.9  Indeed, pregnancy 
discrimination makes up a significant chunk of the maternal wall.  According to 
one author, reviewing the literature on pregnancy discrimination, “[a]lmost half 
of all working women in western countries have experienced tangible 
discrimination on this basis, such as being denied training opportunities, changes 
to job descriptions, criticism of their performance or appearance, reduced 
working hours and dismissal without good reason after the announcement of 
pregnancy.”10  The number of charges alleging pregnancy discrimination filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased by 
 
 6. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-1226, 2013 WL 1462041 (U.S. Apr. 8, 
2013). 
 7. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 2008 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (122 Stat.) 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102). 
 8. For example, the EEOC has issued guidance on discrimination related to caregivers in the 
workplace. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/caregiving.html. See also Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for 
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77 (2003). 
 9. See Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental 
Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 737, 751 (2004) (suggesting that 
pregnancy is the trigger for discrimination against mothers, and that discrimination against working 
mothers can begin even before the birth of a child). 
 10. Liisa Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related Discrimination and Leader-follower 
Relationships, 19 GENDER, WORK AND ORG. 677, 680 (2012). 
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41.1% between 2000 and 2010, on top of almost as large an increase in the decade 
prior.11  In the past five years, the EEOC has pursued and obtained significant 
damages in pregnancy discrimination cases.12  In 2012, it released a draft strategic 
plan that included “accommodating pregnancy when women have been forced 
onto unpaid leave after being denied accommodations routinely provided to 
similarly situated employees” among the “emerging issues” it plans to target.13  
Media outlets have started to note the rise in claims and the apparent persistence 
of pregnancy discrimination.14  Although pregnancy takes up a relatively short 
time in the average woman’s participation in the labor force, the effects of 
discrimination against pregnant workers continue long after pregnancies end.15 
In contrast to the tilt of popular narratives about mothers’ “choices” to 
reduce their attachment to the workforce—narratives that implicitly reference the 
experiences of a select group of women—the women who lose the most under 
the courts’ cramped readings of the PDA are the least privileged and most 
economically vulnerable women.  The PDA is failing the women who need it 
most—those who work inflexible hours or in rigidly structured work settings or 
who perform physically demanding tasks.  Cases like the one brought by a 
pregnant fitting room attendant at Wal-Mart who claimed that she was fired for 
carrying a water bottle at work (per doctor’s orders) illustrate the problem.16  
Professional women in more flexible work settings may still lose their cases, but 
they have a better chance of finding at least some protection under the Act, if 
they can prove that their opportunities were limited based on stereotyped and 
 
 11. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges EEOC & 
FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2011 (2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm; see NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE PREGNANCY 
DISCRIMINATION ACT: WHERE WE STAND 30 YEARS LATER 12 (2008) (noting, among other trends, a 
dramatic increase in claims filed by women of color).  See also N. Woodward, Pregnancy Discrimination 
Grows, 50(7) HR MAG. 78-83 (2005) (noting the growth of pregnancy discrimination cases filed with 
the EEOC). 
 12. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 11, at 11 (noting an increase in the 
percentage of EEOC-instigated lawsuits that include a pregnancy discrimination claim from 1.3% in 
1997 to 8.6% in 2006). See also EEOC, supra note 11 (showing that monetary benefits paid out annually 
through EEOC conciliations, not including subsequent litigation, more than doubled in the last 
decade, rising from $5.6 million in 1997 to $12.2 million in 2008, with an all-time high of $30 million 
collected in 2007 alone). 
 13. EEOC, Strategic Enforcement Plan (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov 
/eeoc/plan/sep_public_draft.cfm. 
 14. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, When the Stork Carries a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at B6 
(reporting suspicion among lawyers that “some employers are now using the law’s laxity and the 
dismal economy to tacitly discriminate against new or expectant mothers”); Stephanie Armour, 
Pregnant Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2005, at B1 (noting a “soaring” 
number of pregnancy discrimination claims); Tresa Baldas, Pregnancy Discrimination Suits on the Rise, 
NAT’L L.J., April 14, 2006, at 4 (noting increase in pregnancy discrimination lawsuits, “particularly 
among high-level female executives who claim that they are being knocked off the corporate ladder 
because of maternity issues”). 
 15. See D.M. Houston & G. Marks, The Role of Planning and Workplace Support in Returning to Work 
after Maternity Leave, 41(2) BRITISH J. OF INDUS. REL. 197,(2003) (discussing research showing that an 
employee’s experiences in the workplace while pregnant influence her decisions about whether and 
when to return to work after childbirth). 
 16. See Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 2168911 at *2 (D. Kan. July 
21, 2009). 
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untrue assumptions about how pregnancy affects their work capacity or 
commitment.  And they have a greater chance of reconciling the effects of 
pregnancy with work obligations without needing to resort to litigation.  In 
short, while the PDA still offers some protection from animus-based 
discrimination, it has become increasingly unhelpful to those women whose 
pregnancies are most likely to harm their economic security. 
Recent scholarship on pregnancy discrimination has pressed for treating 
pregnancy as a disability under the ADA.  This work raises the question of 
whether the ADA might better address the issues facing pregnant workers, and if 
so, whether there remains any real need for a reinvigorated PDA.  We consider 
this question and conclude that there is still value in addressing the harm of 
pregnancy discrimination specifically as a sex equality right, even if (indeed, 
even though) we agree with those scholars making the case for recognizing 
pregnancy as a disability under the ADA.  There is a distinctive history of 
framing challenges to pregnancy discrimination as a sex equality right that is 
worth preserving, and strengthening the sex equality foundations of the right 
may potentially strengthen the broader social and legal movements for gender 
equality and reproductive justice. 
Part I of this Article sketches the origins of the PDA, the backdrop of 
Supreme Court decisions leading to its enactment, and the Supreme Court’s 
cases interpreting the Act.  The Act purported to herald a new era in which 
pregnant women could obtain, perform, and retain jobs despite becoming 
pregnant.  The PDA was crucial in dismantling widespread employer practices 
that stereotyped pregnant women as unsuitable for paid work and summarily 
dismissed them from jobs or barred their entry in the first place.  School district 
policies barring pregnant women from teaching once they “showed” were 
emblematic of such practices.17  The law reflected more “enlightened” views 
about pregnancy and its compatibility with paid work, and the Supreme Court 
cases interpreting the Act have largely remained true to these purposes.  Despite 
these auspicious beginnings, an increasingly hostile judiciary has narrowed the 
definition of pregnancy discrimination and the categories of workers deemed 
useable as comparators, creating significant gaps in the statute’s protections. 
Part II explores these gaps and the doctrinal questions that have befuddled 
lower courts in recent years.  It focuses on two primary problems.  First, courts 
have come to understand the first clause of the PDA to prohibit only those 
actions that penalize the status of pregnancy rather than its actual effects.  
Second, and even more importantly, courts have stripped clause two of the PDA 
of its substantive content.  In a disturbing new trend, courts have allowed 
employers to grant accommodations to other workers but withhold them from 
pregnant employees as long as the employer can point to some pregnancy-
neutral basis for distinguishing them.  Courts are doing this despite clear 
statutory language directing employers to treat pregnant workers the same as 
others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”18  This approach collapses 
 
 17. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (challenging the 
constitutionality of mandatory maternity leave rules requiring a pregnant school teacher to take 
unpaid leave  for five months before expected childbirth until three months after giving birth). 
 18. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
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the first and second clauses of the PDA and reinvigorates the kind of sui generis 
treatment of pregnancy in the Gilbert ruling that Congress sought to override. 
Part III discusses some common themes that these recent developments in 
pregnancy discrimination law share with discrimination law generally, including 
courts’ resistance to perceived “bootstrapping,” hostility to accommodation 
requirements, and an increasing emphasis on conscious animus as the only 
legitimate target of discrimination law.  This Part then discusses why these 
themes, while not wholly unexpected in the PDA, are particularly striking in 
light of the text of the statute.  We then sketch the gender ideology underlying 
these rifts in the PDA case law.  At bottom, ideologies about pregnancy, 
maternity and work are interfering with the courts’ ability to recognize 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy despite the clear text of the PDA. 
Part IV considers the implications of the PDA from the perspective of social 
justice feminism.  Social justice feminism responds to calls for attention to 
intersectionality, anti-essentialism, and class by examining the multivariate 
dimensions of gender injustices.19  The PDA’s shortcomings are troublesome for 
all women, but especially for women in lower-wage jobs, traditionally male 
occupations, and highly structured workplaces.  These women are 
disproportionately poor or working class, and disproportionately women of 
color.  The work-life “balance” issues of more privileged women most often set 
the terms of the cultural debate about combining paid work and maternity.20  But 
the conflicts between pregnancy and work, and the law’s inadequate response to 
them, play out most severely among the most economically vulnerable women—
those for whom choice is minimal or absent. 
Finally, Part V acknowledges the call of disability law scholars to include 
pregnancy as a protected disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and considers the implications of that argument for the PDA.  While our position 
is in no way antithetical to those calls—indeed, we find persuasive the “social 
model” of disability that should encompass pregnancy—we believe that the 
ADA should not be viewed as a replacement for the PDA.  While pregnant 
workers should pursue all viable legal claims for addressing discrimination, the 
PDA has a distinctive role in anchoring the women’s legal movement for gender 
equality.  It should be reinvigorated rather than abandoned.  Chronicling the 
flaws in current interpretations of the PDA, and elaborating the troubling gender 
ideologies behind them, is a first step in that process. 
I. THE EARLY PROMISE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
The PDA responds to a long history of state laws and employer practices 
purportedly protecting women from the rigors of work and its incompatibility 
with motherhood.  State laws often relied on pregnancy-based classifications 
 
(2012). 
 19. See, e.g., Kristen Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 
131 (2010). 
 20. See, for example, the high profile and controversial discussions triggered by Lisa Belkin, The 
Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t 
Have it All, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020. 
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when regulating employment generally or setting policies for public employees.  
In Muller v. Oregon, for example, decided in 1908, the Supreme Court upheld a 
law restricting the number of hours women could work in laundries on the 
theory that the state was justified in acting to protect the “maternal functions” of 
women.21  Such laws ostensibly accommodated the domestic and reproductive 
obligations of women to protect them from exploitation by employers.  As 
Deborah Dinner explains, female-only minimum wage laws attempted to “shift[] 
the social costs of substandard wages back onto employers,” while maximum-
hours laws “alleviated the burden placed upon women by the unequal division 
of childrearing labor within the home, without challenging its normative 
correctness.”22  But this “protection” was often a pretext for preserving better 
jobs for men and did not affect all women equally.23  Working-class women and 
women of color “spearheaded the campaign against the laws” because they 
“faced the greatest economic need to access the higher-paying blue-collar jobs 
that protective laws placed beyond their reach.”24  And while they suffered the 
most from the costs of protection, these women received relatively few of the 
benefits.  They “worked disproportionately in occupations excluded from the 
Fair Labor Standards Act as well as from state protective-labor laws.”25  Vestiges 
of this regime lingered long into the twentieth century, as a wide variety of state 
laws and employer policies restricted occupations, job duration, and benefits 
based on sex, pregnancy, childbirth, childrearing, or a combination thereof, all 
designed to reinforce (white) women’s prescribed maternal roles.26 
A. The Pre-PDA Legal Landscape 
The landscape began to shift in the early 1970s, when women’s rights 
advocates succeeded in establishing a constitutional right of sex equality and the 
statutory ban on sex discrimination in Title VII began to take shape.27  Whether 
these rights protected against pregnancy discrimination was initially unclear.  
Women began bringing claims alleging “pregnancy discrimination” shortly after 
the EEOC was established in 1965, only to find that little thought had been given 
to whether that was a cognizable claim.28  Responding to pressure from 
 
 21. 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). 
 22. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 444-45 (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1219, 1237-38, 1239 (1986) (observing that “[f]etal vulnerability policies excluding all fertile 
women have been adopted only in male-dominated industries,” while “women are generally allowed 
to work in women’s jobs without restrictions based on fetal safety”); David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, 
Gender Justice, and the Justices: The Limits of Equality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101, 115 (1992) 
(“Expressions of corporate concern for the plight of fetuses . . . have been highly selective.  Businesses 
that depend heavily on women workers have been much less scrupulous about the dangers they 
impose on the unborn . . . .”). 
 24. Dinner, supra note 22, at 446. 
 25. Id. at 445. 
 26. This era of workplace policies is explored in detail in Grossman, supra note 4. 
 27. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a sex-based classification in an Idaho 
intestacy statute on grounds that it did not bear a sufficient relation to the government’s purpose); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications). 
 28. Dinner, supra note 22, at 455-57. 
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advocates, the EEOC issued its first guidelines on pregnancy discrimination in 
1972, concluding that Title VII extended to discrimination based on pregnancy.29  
But the law developed unevenly.  Despite the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme 
Court ruled twice in the 1970s that pregnancy discrimination is not sex 
discrimination.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld, against an equal 
protection challenge, California’s disability insurance program, which expressly 
excluded normal pregnancy from the list of covered disabilities.30  The Court 
rejected the argument that pregnancy-based classifications should receive the 
heightened scrutiny it had implicitly, albeit without express acknowledgement, 
already applied to sex-based classifications.31  Relegating the bulk of its analysis 
to a footnote, the Court explained, infamously: “There is no risk from which men 
are protected and women are not.  Likewise, there is no risk from which women 
are protected and men are not. . . . The program divides potential recipients into 
two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”32  The Court thought 
it obvious that there was no connection between the “excluded disability and 
gender.”33 
Two years later, the Court upheld a similar plan by a private employer 
against a Title VII challenge.  In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,34 the Court tracked 
its equal protection reasoning from Geduldig and applied it to Title VII, holding 
that excluding normal pregnancy from a disability benefit plan did not 
discriminate based on sex.35  The Court rejected the contrary interpretations of 
the EEOC and the seven federal courts of appeals that had followed the EEOC’s 
lead.36  Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion.37 
As bad as these decisions were for pregnant working women, the Supreme 
Court’s pregnancy jurisprudence did not foreclose all challenges to pregnancy-
based employment policies.  The treatment of pregnant workers could still be 
successfully challenged if it punished women for the status of being pregnant, 
without regard to pregnancy’s actual effect on women as workers.  In Nashville 
Gas Co. v. Satty,38 decided only one year after Gilbert, the Court invalidated an 
employer policy forcing pregnant women to take leave from work and then 
denying them their previously accumulated seniority when bidding for new 
positions thereafter.  As the Court reconciled this position with Gilbert, 
employers were not required to provide benefits to “one sex or the other ‘because 
 
 29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972); 37 FED. REG. 6836 (1972).  On the advocacy before and after the 
EEOC guidelines were issued, see Dinner, supra note 22, at 423-24. 
 30. 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 31. Reed purported to invalidate the Idaho statute on rational basis review, but, with hindsight, 
the case is understood as having taken the first step towards intermediate scrutiny. 
 32. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974). 
 33. Id. at 497 n.20. 
 34. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 35. Id. at 133-40. 
 36. Id. at 140-46. 
 37. Id. at 146-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
506 n.3 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the ruling in Gilbert as a “notable exception” to the 
Court’s usual “method of interpretation”). 
 38. 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977). 
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of their differing roles in the scheme of human existence,’” but neither could they 
“burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment 
opportunities.”39 
Two other cases from this era illustrate the same theme.  In Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur,40 decided the same term as Geduldig, the Court used the 
due process clause to invalidate several school district policies forcing pregnant 
teachers to leave work early in their pregnancies and allowing them to return 
only three months after childbirth.41  To do so, the Court applied the now-
defunct irrebuttable presumption doctrine in conjunction with the emerging 
right to privacy surrounding decisions related to reproduction.42  Public 
employers could not arbitrarily assume that pregnancy and childbirth would 
disable all women at fixed times and for a fixed duration.43  The following year, 
the Court again struck down a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing pregnant 
women’s capacity in Turner v. Department of Employment Security.44 There, the 
Court struck down a Utah law prohibiting a pregnant woman from collecting 
unemployment benefits from twelve weeks prior to her due date until six weeks 
after she actually gave birth based on a conclusive presumption that she would 
be unable to work during that period.45  The fatal error of the law was in using a 
fixed marker of incapacity for all pregnant women despite the fact that “a 
substantial number of women are fully capable of working well into their last 
trimester of pregnancy and of resuming employment shortly after childbirth.”46 
A woman who is able to work through pregnancy without missing a beat is 
entitled to be judged on that basis, rather than on the experiences of pregnant 
women generally. 
Together, the Court’s pre-PDA precedents from the 1970s drew a line in the 
sand: pregnant women were not entitled to any “special” benefits or treatment 
based on their pregnancy; but neither could employers penalize those women 
who were able to work while pregnant, with all the attendant benefits that 
continued employment entails.  To put it in the starkest terms, a pregnant worker 
who could work like a man (or, to use the Court’s Geduldig nomenclature, a 
nonpregnant person) had the right to continue to do so. 
B. The Enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
The Court’s ruling in Gilbert spurred momentum in Congress to expand 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 41. Id.at 647-48. For an excellent discussion of the feminist litigation strategy in LaFleur, in which 
women’s rights lawyers sought to integrate sex equality and reproductive liberty rights, and their 
partial vindication in the Court’s decision, see generally Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur 
Doctrine, 22 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 343 (2010). 
 42. 414 U.S. at 643-48.  On the subsequent fall of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, see John 
C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl L. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. 
REV. 1211, 1237–38 (1998) (noting that the Court “threw in the towel” on this doctrine, which was 
awkwardly used to remedy “substantive concerns” with “procedural restrictions”). 
 43. 414 U.S. at 640. 
 44. 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
 45. Id. at 46.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(h)(1) (1974). 
 46. 423 U.S. at 46. 
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protections to pregnant workers beyond the limited set of rights recognized by 
the Court.47  The Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers 
proposed, and ultimately gained, a new law amending Title VII to ban 
pregnancy discrimination as a species of sex discrimination.48  By March of 1977, 
there was bipartisan support for the bill, which aimed to override the Court’s 
decision in Gilbert.49 The bill heralded 86 bi-partisan co-sponsors when it was 
introduced in March of 1977, and was enacted into law 19 months later on 
October 31, 1978.50  The bill passed both houses of Congress by wide margins: 75-
11 in the Senate and 376-43 in the House.51  The limited opposition was “half-
hearted and perfunctory.”52  Objections centered mostly on the law’s 
implications for employer reimbursement for abortion and on the costs to 
employers of compliance.53 
The PDA was a swift rejection of the Court’s philosophy on pregnancy: the 
idea that ignoring the status of pregnancy fully met an employer’s obligation to 
pregnant workers.  Instead, the Act was designed to “enable women to maintain 
labor-force attachments throughout pregnancy and childbirth.”54  Toward that 
end, it insisted that employers abandon express rules and policies that classified 
on the basis of pregnancy, as well as stereotyped ways of thinking about 
pregnant women as workers.55  Congress did not hide its disdain for the Gilbert 
decision and its intent to override it.56  The Act amends the definition section of 
Title VII by adding a new provision, as follows: 
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in Title VII] include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
 
 47. See Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2009) (chronicling the passage of the 
PDA). 
 48. Dinner, supra note 22, at 469-73. 
 49. 123 Cong. Rec. 6645 (1977); H.R. Res. 4357, 95th Cong. (1977). 
 50. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 51. 123 Cong. Rec. 29635, 29640-65 (1977); 124 Cong. Rec. H6862-70; 124 Cong. Rec. H6878, 124 
Cong. Rec. 21421 (1978). 
 52. Pedriana, supra note 47, at 12. 
 53. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 15 n. 
52 (2007).  The final version of the Act contains an abortion neutrality provision relieving employers 
of any obligation to provide health insurance coverage for abortion, with exceptions for medical 
complications arising from abortion or where the life of the woman is at stake.  Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 54. Dinner, supra note 22, at 484. 
 55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (Senate Committee report explaining that the Act was designed “to reflect 
the ‘commonsense’ view and to insure that working women are protected against all forms of 
employment discrimination based on sex”). 
 56. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987) (observing that the PDA 
unambiguously overturned Gilbert); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 
669, 678 (1983) (observing that the PDA unambiguously overturned Gilbert). 
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inability to work.57 
The Act contains two distinct clauses.  The first clause marks a wholesale 
rejection of the Court’s failure to recognize pregnancy discrimination as a form of 
sex discrimination, declaring discrimination “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy. . .” to be a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.58  The structure 
of the PDA is as an amendment to the definition section of the statute, defining 
the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” “[f]or purposes of [Title 
VII].”59  Notably, these two terms are not found, in this precise form, anywhere 
else in the statute.  They do appear, however, in the Gilbert decision.  There, the 
Court stated that the exclusion of pregnancy does not discriminate “on the basis 
of sex”60 and found the pregnancy exclusion to be compatible with Congress’ 
command to prohibit discrimination “because of. . .sex. . .”61 Congress’ drafting 
of the PDA—while odd in purporting to define statutory terms that do not 
appear anywhere else in the statute—makes sense in light of the role the Gilbert 
decision played in the enactment of the PDA.  The Act was a response to that 
decision, and the drafting choice reflects Congress’ intention to repudiate the 
Gilbert approach to pregnancy discrimination. 
The first clause of the PDA ensures that Title VII’s tool kit, with all of its 
theories for challenging sex discrimination, is fully applicable to pregnancy 
discrimination.  Accordingly, a facial policy that discriminates on the basis of 
pregnancy is invalid unless the employer proves that not being pregnant is a 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).  Intentional, but unadmitted, acts of 
pregnancy discrimination can be challenged under either the pretext or mixed 
motive model of disparate treatment.  In theory, pregnancy discrimination may 
also be challenged as systemic disparate treatment, although the small numbers 
of pregnant women in the workplace may make this theory unavailable in 
practice.62  The disparate impact theory is also applicable for pregnancy 
discrimination, although, as we discuss below, it rarely succeeds in such claims. 
Because clause one simply added pregnancy to Title VII’s existing structure, 
its meaning has posed fewer interpretive problems than clause two.  Clause two 
has proven to be especially challenging because it is not modeled on any other 
anti-discrimination provision in federal law.  It provides that women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work.”63 The relationship between clause 
one and clause two might be viewed in a number of different ways.  Clause two 
 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976). 
 61. Id. at 145 (ellipses in original). 
 62. The EEOC unsuccessfully attempted to bring such a suit in a high-profile pregnancy 
discrimination case.  See EEOC v. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that the 
EEOC failed to provide sufficient statistical proof of a pattern and practice of pregnancy-based 
discrimination).  The Supreme Court added to the hurdles for litigants bringing a private class action 
challenge in all systemic disparate treatment cases in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:24 AM 
 UNPROTECTED SEX 77 
might be described as: (1) setting the limits of what amounts to pregnancy 
discrimination in clause one (e.g., defining what it means to discriminate on the 
basis of pregnancy); (2) describing the remedy to a violation of clause one (e.g., 
once a plaintiff proves pregnancy discrimination, the remedy is to treat pregnant 
women the same as others similar in their ability to work); (3) creating a defense 
to a pregnancy discrimination claim (what might otherwise be pregnancy 
discrimination is not unlawful if pregnant women are treated the same as others 
similar in ability to work); or (4) establishing an independent violation of the 
PDA if pregnant workers are treated worse than other workers similar in their 
ability to work.  The fourth approach best matches the text and legislative history 
of the Act, as a response to Gilbert and an override of that decision.  Although the 
Supreme Court’s PDA decisions are most compatible with this interpretation, 
lower federal courts have increasingly gravitated towards the first and second 
approaches, tying the reach of the second clause to the scope of the first, instead 
of treating clause two as sufficient to establish a violation of the Act.  Properly 
understood, the second clause creates a comparative right to accommodation.  
Because clause one provides no absolute protection for pregnancy, clause two 
has become an important source of PDA rights and the main game in litigation 
under the PDA. 
C. The PDA in the Supreme Court 
Since the PDA’s enactment, only a handful of cases involving pregnancy 
discrimination claims have reached the Supreme Court.  Despite the Court’s 
earlier track record on pregnancy discrimination, the Court’s PDA rulings have 
taken a relatively strong reading of the Act.  Perhaps ironically, but in keeping 
with the Court’s trend of developing sex discrimination law through claims 
brought by men, the Court’s first PDA case was a claim alleging pregnancy 
discrimination against male employees.  In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry 
Dock Co. v. EEOC,64 male employees challenged the employer’s policy of 
providing health insurance coverage for pregnancy and childbirth to its female 
employees, but not to the wives of its male employees.  The Court ruled that the 
exclusion violated the PDA, since other health conditions of employees’ spouses 
were covered.65 
Although this decision is usually treated as inconsequential (apart from 
illustrating the lengths to which the Court would go to conceptualize sex 
discrimination as discrimination against men, even when it comes to pregnancy), 
it establishes two important principles for our purposes.  First, the Court 
followed the broad wording of the Act, requiring pregnancy to be treated as well 
as other medical conditions, despite the likelihood of a narrower intent of 
Congress, since nothing in the legislative history suggested a concern for the 
treatment of workers’ wives. Second, the ruling implicitly rejects a reading of the 
second clause that would require proof of pregnancy-based animus to establish a 
violation.  After all, the employer did cover employees’ pregnancies—it was only 
the pregnancies of the wives of male workers that were excluded. Rather than a 
 
 64. 462 U.S. 669 (1983) 
 65. Id. at 683-84. 
Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:24 AM 
78 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 21:67 2013 
general animus toward pregnancy, the employer’s motivation was based on cost.  
True to Congress’ rejection of Gilbert (where the policy was also defended based 
on cost), the employer’s motivation could not salvage the policy. 
A separate and more controversial issue in the early PDA litigation was 
whether clause two foreclosed treating pregnant workers more generously than 
other workers. This issue sparked a divisive tactical battle among women’s rights 
advocates in the years soon after the PDA’s enactment.  In a number of cases, 
employers—either voluntarily or as required by state laws—provided benefits 
and/or leave policies that were more generous for pregnancy than for other 
conditions.  The question was whether clause two of the PDA foreclosed such 
different treatment.  Feminist litigators and scholars differed on the answer to 
this question.  Although equal treatment—treating women and men alike for 
work-related purposes—had generally been the rallying cry of second-wave 
feminists, reflected in multiple legislative and judicial sex equality successes,66 
cases of physical difference like pregnancy provoked profound disagreement.  
One group argued for equal treatment—pregnant women would sink or swim 
together with other similarly affected workers, but would avoid the harms of 
marking pregnancy for special treatment.67  Others argued for a more substantive 
approach to equality that would specifically accommodate pregnancy, regardless 
of how other workers were treated, in order to attain equal workplace outcomes 
for men and women who reproduce.68 
This dispute played out in two high-profile cases in the 1980s, testing the 
meaning of the PDA’s second clause.  In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm’r of Labor and 
Industry,69 an employer challenged a Montana law requiring maternity leave, 
alleging that it was inconsistent with the PDA’s guarantee that pregnant workers 
be treated “the same as” other comparably disabled workers.  The same question 
was decided three years later in California Federal Savings v. Guerra,70 a case in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the PDA preempted a 
California law requiring employers to provide up to four months unpaid leave 
for pregnancy- or childbirth-related disability.  In Miller-Wohl, the Montana 
Supreme Court endorsed an accommodation approach that permitted the state to 
require maternity leave regardless of whether leave was provided for 
comparably disabled workers.71 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this same 
interpretation of the PDA in Guerra, concluding that, “Congress intended the 
PDA to be ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not 
 
 66. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 34-49 (3rd ed. 
2013) (describing the era of liberal feminism and the movement for equal treatment). 
 67. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982) [hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis]; Wendy W. 
Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). 
 68. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, 
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.  513, 537-57 (1983); 
Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 426-30 (1981); see also CHAMALLAS, 
supra note 66, at 55 (noting that the feminist divide in the pregnancy cases was “as much about 
strategy as fundamental theory”). 
 69. 214 Mont. 238 (1984). 
 70. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 71. 214 Mont. at 259-60. 
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a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”72  Thus, under clause two, employers 
may treat pregnancy better than other disabling conditions, but may not treat it 
any worse.73  The Court’s ruling effectively reads clause two as a vehicle for 
protecting pregnant workers’ job security and benefits; not as a restraint on 
measures taken by employers to make the workplace more hospitable to 
pregnant women.  The decision embodies a substantive equality approach to 
pregnancy discrimination, prioritizing actual workplace security for pregnant 
workers over formal neutrality. 
In an alternative holding, the Court upheld the California law on the 
additional grounds that it did not actually conflict with the PDA, even if it had 
read the PDA to insist on formal neutrality between pregnancy and other 
conditions.74  In the Court’s view, this was not a case in which “compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” nor an “inevitable 
collision between the two schemes of regulation.”75  Rather, employers could 
satisfy the California law by offering maternity leave, and are “free to give 
comparable benefits to other disabled employees” if that were required by the 
PDA.76  The alternative holding further strengthens the reading of clause two as a 
mandate for the comparable treatment of pregnancy, without regard to the 
employer’s reason for treating pregnancy less favorably than other conditions. 
The following decade, the Court added to its robust PDA precedents.  
International Union v. Johnson Controls involved a challenge to the validity of an 
employer’s so-called “fetal protection” policy barring fertile women from 
holding jobs in a battery manufacturing plant that involved exposure to lead.77  
Before the enactment of Title VII in 1964, Johnson Controls had excluded women 
completely from battery-manufacturing jobs.78  It then began to hire women into 
these jobs; after 1977, it did so with a stern warning about the possible dangers of 
lead exposure to an unborn child.79  In 1982, Johnson Controls shifted its policy 
again to exclude “women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing 
children” from all jobs involving lead exposure, as well as all jobs in which they 
could bid, bump, transfer, or be promoted into a job with lead exposure.80  This 
change was prompted by tests showing elevated levels of lead in the blood of a 
few women who became pregnant, although there was no proof that the high 
 
 72. 479 U.S. at 285.  The appendix to the federal regulations on pregnancy discrimination 
reinforces the Court’s view of the PDA as setting a floor for the treatment of pregnancy.  A question-
and-answer section following the substantive regulations states: “If, for example, a State law requires 
an employer to pay a maximum of 26 weeks benefits for disabilities other than pregnancy-related 
ones but only six weeks for pregnancy-related disabilities, the employer must provide benefits for the 
additional weeks to an employee disabled by pregnancy-related conditions, up to the maximum 
provided other disabled employees.”  29 C.F.R. § 1604 app., Q. 19 (2012). 
 73. The Court’s reasoning restricted an employer’s more favorable treatment of pregnancy to the 
actual physically disabling period of pregnancy and recovery; it foreclosed differences in treatment 
based on stereotypes about caretaking, apart from any actual impairment. 
 74. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 291. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991). 
 78. Id. at 191. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 192. 
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levels led to any injury or birth defect.81  Under the new policy, a woman was 
deemed “capable of bearing children” unless her “inability to bear children [was] 
medically documented.”82 
The policy was challenged by several plaintiffs, including: a woman who 
chose to be sterilized rather than lose her job; a 50-year-old woman who was 
involuntarily transferred to a lower-paying job with no lead exposure; and a man 
who asked to transfer out of a lead-exposure job because he wanted to start a 
family, but was denied.83 
A threshold issue in the case was whether the company’s policy constituted 
facial sex discrimination.  Johnson Controls had argued that the policy was sex 
neutral because it did not exclude all women and was not motivated by animus 
towards women, but a benevolent interest in protecting children.84  Remarkably, 
the lower court agreed, treating the policy as unintentional discrimination 
subject only to disparate impact challenge.85  Accordingly, the court applied the 
more lenient business necessity defense instead of the tougher bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.86 
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the policy was facially 
discriminatory because it “classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing 
capacity, rather than fertility alone.”87  The Court’s conclusion that the policy 
constituted facial sex discrimination was “bolstered” by the PDA, which makes 
clear that discrimination “based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, 
discrimination because of her sex.”88  Moreover, the Court continued, “the 
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy 
into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.”89  The illegality of facial 
discrimination “does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather 
on the explicit terms of the discrimination.”90 
Having found facial discrimination, the Court considered and rejected the 
employer’s BFOQ defense, finding that female sterility was not “reasonably 
necessary” to the “normal operation” of the business, since it was not necessary 
to perform the job of making batteries.91  The Court explained that the BFOQ 
defense operates no differently for pregnancy than it does for sex, seeing in the 
PDA’s second clause “a BFOQ standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees 
differ from others ‘in their ability or inability to work,’ they must be ‘treated the 
same’ as other employees ‘for all employment-related purposes.’”92  The Court 
cautioned against an interpretation that would “read the second clause out of the 
 
 81. Id. at 191-92. 
 82. Id. at 192. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 195-97. 
 85. Id. at 193. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 198. 
 88. Id. at 199. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 202-04 (distinguishing the present case from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)). 
 92. Id. at 204. 
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Act.”93 
The decision necessarily rejects an approach that would limit pregnancy 
discrimination to cases where the disfavored treatment of pregnancy is traceable 
to animus.  Under the Johnson Controls ruling, treating pregnancy worse than 
other conditions with a similar effect on work violates the PDA even if the 
employer has a “benign” reason for doing so.94 
After a long hiatus from pregnancy discrimination cases, the Court decided 
another one in 2009.  In that case, AT&T v. Hulteen,95 the issue was whether 
AT&T violated the PDA by paying retired female employees lower pensions 
because they took unpaid pregnancy-related leaves between 1968 and 1974, 
before passage of the PDA. These women lost service credit for the duration of 
their leaves, while other workers who took disability leave during that time 
period were given full service credit.96  Today, such a practice would violate the 
PDA; back then, it was perfectly lawful.  Because pensions are based on years of 
service, women retiring long after the PDA’s enactment were still getting less 
money every month because of AT&T’s past treatment of their pregnancy leaves.  
The plaintiffs argued that the company’s reliance on differential service credits to 
calculate pensions for their present retirement was an unlawful employment 
practice.97 
The majority sided with AT&T, ruling that the service credit system was not 
the product of intent to discriminate, since the system was not unlawful at the 
time and therefore was a “bona fide seniority system,” a defense to Title VII 
claims.98  As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, however, this ruling 
extends the effects of Gilbert into another millennium, despite the clear intent of 
Congress to repudiate it.99 
It is too soon to say whether Hulteen is a blip on the screen—an anomalous 
decision limited to its facts and best explained by the Court’s special solicitude 
for employee reliance interests in seniority systems—or if it marks a backdoor 
return to the pre-PDA, Gilbert approach to pregnancy discrimination.  But apart 
from that single case, and despite its inauspicious beginning in the early 1970s, 
the Supreme Court in its post-PDA opinions has read and applied the statute 
consistently with its plain meaning and purpose: to override Gilbert and secure 
for pregnant workers at least the same kinds of treatment and adjustments made 
for other conditions with a similar effect on work. 
Cases outside the pregnancy context also reveal an appreciation for the 
gender stereotyping and discrimination that working women face in relation to 
pregnancy.  While not a PDA case per se, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs upheld the caretaking leave authorized by the Family Medical Leave Act as 
a valid exercise of Congress’ power to remedy violations of the Fourteenth 
 
 93. Id. at 205. 
 94. Id. at 198-99. 
 95. 556 U.S. 701 (2009). 
 96. Id. at 706. 
 97. Id. at 707. 
 98. Id. at 707-715. 
 99. Id. at 719 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:24 AM 
82 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 21:67 2013 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.100  The Court’s reasoning, which treats 
mandatory gender-neutral caretaking leave as an appropriate remedy in light of 
widespread discrimination and stereotyping against mothers as lacking a full 
commitment to the workforce, shows sensitivity to the harmful and lasting 
effects of stereotypes about pregnant women and mothers in the workplace. 
II. THE PDA IN THE LOWER COURTS: FLASHBACKS TO GEDULDIG AND GILBERT 
While the Supreme Court has paved the path for a robust interpretation of 
the PDA, lower courts have not lived up to that promise.  This section briefly 
discusses the lower courts’ narrow readings of the PDA’s protections under 
clause one, and then turns to their increasingly problematic interpretation of 
clause two. 
A.  Clause One: Protecting the Status of Pregnancy, Not its Effects 
What does it mean to discriminate because of pregnancy and conditions 
related to it?  This question is at the core of the first clause of the PDA, which 
adds “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions” to the list of bases 
on which employers may not discriminate.  Like the other forms of 
discrimination covered by Title VII, pregnancy discrimination that is not 
embodied in a formal policy can be challenged under the first clause using either 
the pretext model (it is more likely than not that the employer’s action would not 
have been taken but for the employee’s pregnancy) or the mixed motive proof 
structure (pregnancy was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision).  But 
pregnancy is a more complicated characteristic than sex or race in that it is both a 
status and a physical condition with real (though variable) effects on work.  
Courts understand the PDA’s first clause to disallow discrimination based on 
status, but to allow it based on the effects of the condition itself.  So while 
“pregnancy” as status cannot be the reason (or a motivating factor) for the 
employer’s action, the physical effects of pregnancy that interfere with work 
capacity can be.  Two classic cases illustrate this point. 
In Troupe v. May Department Stores, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a 
department store did not commit pregnancy discrimination when it fired a retail 
sales clerk for excessive tardiness caused by morning sickness.101  The plaintiff 
had no tardiness problems prior to experiencing pregnancy-related morning 
sickness, but the store claimed that it would have fired any employee who had 
similar tardiness problems and was about to take an extended medical leave.102 
In affirming summary judgment for the employer, Judge Posner refused to see 
the firing as pregnancy discrimination, absent proof that an otherwise similarly 
situated, non-pregnant employee received better treatment: 
 
 100. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding care-taking leave provision of FMLA against Eleventh 
Amendment challenge on grounds that it was a congruent and proportional response under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to a state-sponsored history of discrimination against pregnant 
women and mothers in the workplace); see also Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: 
Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006). 
 101. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 102. Id. at 738. 
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We must imagine a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was, 
also because of health problems, and who is about to take a protracted sick leave 
growing out of those problems at an expense to Lord & Taylor equal to that of 
Ms. Troupe’s maternity leave.  If [the employer] would have fired our 
hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she 
was pregnant but because she cost the company more than she was worth to 
it.103 
Although the PDA did not permit the store to fire Troupe simply for being 
pregnant, it could fire her if her pregnancy interfered with her job performance, 
as long as it would have done the same for other impaired workers with similar 
job performance.  The court saw its job as teasing out whether the employer is 
responding to the work-related aspects of pregnancy or to the status of 
pregnancy itself.104  Putting aside that courts have not been very skilled at 
sussing out the difference, even this theoretical protection goes no further than 
status.105 
A second case, Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, further highlights the difficulty of 
separating the status of pregnancy from its effects.106  The plaintiff was hired as a 
part-time bank teller with the understanding that her job would entail heavy 
seasonal work in the summer.107  After being hired, she learned she was pregnant 
and disclosed both the fact of the pregnancy and her due date to her employer.  
The employer fired her the next day.  The plaintiff won her PDA case.  But the 
grounds on which she prevailed reveal the narrowness of the law’s protection.108  
As the court saw it, the employer’s mistake was not in firing a pregnant 
employee because childbirth interfered with requirements of the job – showing 
up at work during the peak season – but in jumping to the conclusion that the 
plaintiff would not show up for work around the time when she was expected to 
give birth.109  The plaintiff had a right, the court explained, to an individualized 
assessment of her capacity to work, and the employer’s assumption that she 
would require a leave for childbirth reflected unlawful stereotypes about the 
abilities of pregnant women generally.110  While the PDA permits employers to 
“project the normal inconveniences of pregnancy and their secondary effects into 
the future and take actions in accordance with and in proportion to those 
predictions,” it cannot “take anticipatory action unless it has a good faith basis, 
supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the normal inconveniences of an 
employee’s pregnancy will require special treatment.”111  Maldonado was thus 
entitled to keep her job unless and until the employer had reason to know she 
 
 103. Id. at 738. 
 104. Id. at 736. 
 105. Scholars have been largely critical of Posner’s ruling.  See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, 
Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 79-81 (1997); Joan C. Williams et al., I Just Need Water: 
Pregnancy Accommodation after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 
2014) 
 106. 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 107. Id. at 764. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 766-68. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 767. 
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would require a leave during the peak season—at which point it could have 
permissibly fired her if it would have fired a non-pregnant worker in that 
position who needed a leave.  It strengthened Maldonado’s case that she had 
mentioned the possibility of not carrying the pregnancy to term, and that, given 
the early stage of the pregnancy, she might have lost the pregnancy 
involuntarily.112  Most importantly, she had not yet asked for a maternity leave 
when she was fired.  The employer’s preemptive action therefore struck at “the 
core of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,” which provides that “an employer 
cannot discriminate against a pregnant employee simply because it believes 
pregnancy might prevent the employee from doing her job.”113 
Together, the two cases illustrate the limits of clause one of the PDA: 
pregnancy discrimination, while a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, 
occurs when an employer acts based on the status of pregnancy, as opposed to its 
actual effects.  Since employers may act based on pregnancy’s effects on work in 
spite of its status, the Act’s prohibition on pregnancy discrimination leaves much 
room for employers to take actions every bit as harmful to the ability of pregnant 
women to maintain employment. 
This status/effects dichotomy also plays out in the case law defining the 
scope of protection for pregnancy-related conditions.  According to the Senate 
Report accompanying the PDA, the language, “related medical conditions” was 
selected to encompass the full range of “physiological occurrences peculiar to 
women.”114  However, the status/effects dichotomy has meant that workers with 
pregnancy-related conditions have little help from the PDA when their 
conditions impose costs or otherwise clash with workplace rules and structures. 
For example, while employers may not punish a woman for being infertile 
or undergoing treatment for it,115 courts have not interpreted the PDA to require 
employers to pay the costs of medical procedures to facilitate pregnancy.  
Challenges to insurance plans under the PDA for not covering infertility 
treatments such as in vitro fertilization, a procedure only performed on women, 
have not succeeded.116  In the same vein, although provisions in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act have now largely rendered this problem 
obsolete,117 while the PDA forbids penalizing women for being fertile (Johnson 
 
 112. Id. at 767-68. 
 113. Id. at 761. 
 114. S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 3-4 (1977). 
 115. See, e.g.,  Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1994) (finding that the 
inability to become pregnant is a “related medical condition” to pregnancy, such that the PDA 
forbids firing an employee for undergoing fertility treatments that are only performed on women 
seeking to become pregnant); Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the PDA 
protects against discrimination for undergoing fertility treatments to become pregnant, but requiring 
plaintiff to prove that she was fired not simply for the resulting absenteeism, but because her 
absenteeism was caused by infertility treatments). 
 116. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that employer 
health insurance policy denying insurance coverage for infertility procedures done only to women 
did not violate the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
 117. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 45 
C.F.R. § 147 (2011); US Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., News Release of Jan. 20. 
2012,http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html (requiring new and renewed 
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Controls),118 it has been interpreted to permit employer health plans to deny 
coverage of prescription contraceptives, used only by women, to avoid 
pregnancy.119  Likewise, courts have interpreted the PDA to forbid employers 
from penalizing a woman for lactating, but to permit employers to deny 
requested accommodations to enable women to breastfeed or pump breast milk 
during work hours.120  This problem too is now eased by the Affordable Care 
Act, which requires reasonable accommodations for breastfeeding workers.121  
But the courts’ treatment of discrimination claims by lactating mothers reveals 
their limited vision of the PDA’s protections.  Some courts have even interpreted 
the PDA to allow women to be fired for requesting accommodations for 
lactation, restricting the PDA’s protection to those lactating women who suffer in 
silence.122 
The cases on pregnancy and its related conditions read the PDA as drawing 
a line between pregnancy’s status and effects.  But in many instances, it is the 
effects of pregnancy and related conditions that interfere with women’s equality 
in the workplace.  The lower courts’ narrow conception of pregnancy 
discrimination harkens back to a view of pregnancy that the PDA purported to 
reject: a refusal to see a reproductive process unique to women as equivalent to a 
sex-based classification.  The courts’ reasoning in these cases echoes the implicit 
rationale from Gilbert: that pregnancy is a voluntary condition and women bear 
the burdens of that choice if becoming a mother is not compatible with the rigors 
of the workplace.  These cases do not live up to the PDA’s original promise—to 
 
health plans to cover FDA-approved prescription contraceptive methods and counseling at no cost to 
patients).  See also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the PDA does not 
require employers to provide accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers); McNill v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ( deciding that the PDA does not require 
employers to provide accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers); Wallace v. Pyro Mining 
Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (finding that the PDA does not require employers to provide 
accommodations for breastfeeding/lactating mothers). Courts have also denied accommodations to 
breastfeeding workers under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 
F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 118. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 119. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007).  District court 
cases decided before Standridge, the only federal appellate ruling on the issue, are split. Compare 
Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (holding that the PDA requires 
coverage), Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that the 
PDA requires coverage), and EEOC v. UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (finding that 
exclusion violates Title VII ban on sex discrimination) with Cummins v. State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG,  
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005) (holding that the PDA does not require coverage). 
 120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that an 
employer may not punish employee for lactating, a medical condition related to pregnancy under the 
PDA, but is not required to provide special accommodations to pump breast milk during the work 
day). 
 121. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 122. See, e.g., Fortier v. U.S. Steel Grp., No. 01-2029,  2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11788 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 
2002) (rejecting PDA claim based on allegation that she was fired because of her intent to breastfeed); 
Puente v. Ridge, 324 F. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2009). On the challenges of bringing breastfeeding 
discrimination claims, see generally Heather M. Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant 
Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding 
Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333 (2010); Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding 
in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471 (2001). 
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secure women’s equality in the workplace while protecting their reproductive 
rights to become mothers. 
In theory, the availability of disparate impact challenges under the PDA 
might reach employment policies and practices that make it difficult for pregnant 
women to continue working, making up for the failure of intentional 
discrimination theories under clause one to reach beyond penalizing pregnancy 
as a status.123  Disparate impact claims might expose the “latent exclusionary 
bias” against pregnant workers and force employers to redesign workplace 
policies to be more inclusive for a diverse work force.124  But precedent has 
shown disparate impact’s promise to be more theoretical than real in pregnancy-
based claims. 
While the PDA’s definition of discrimination based on sex, amended to 
encompass discrimination based on pregnancy, should make disparate impact 
claims available to challenge workplace practices with a disparate impact on 
pregnant women,125 plaintiffs have very rarely succeeded in bringing such 
claims.126  The reasons for this range from judicial hostility to such claims as a 
demand for preferential treatment,127 to restrictions on the type of practice 
subject to challenge,128 to difficulty identifying the appropriate comparison group 
and insufficient data to prove disparate impact at a particular workplace.129  The 
federal government, litigating as an employer, has even argued that disparate 
 
 123. Disparate impact theory was first judicially recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971), and later codified in the 1991 amendments to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
 124. Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE 
L.J. 929, 939 (1985); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
642, 660-65 (2001). 
 125. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“disparate impact is a 
permissible theory of liability under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as it is under other provisions 
of Title VII.”).  Clause two, entitling pregnant workers to be treated as well as workers with other 
conditions similarly affecting, should not in any way foreclose disparate impact challenges to 
pregnancy-neutral rules.  Cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) 
(describing the PDA’s second clause as a floor but not a ceiling for the treatment of pregnant 
workers). 
 126. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV.  701, 751 
(2006) (noting that “pregnancy cases typically fail under the disparate impact approach”). 
 127. See, e.g., Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (characterizing disparate impact as a “permissible theory” 
under the PDA as long as it is not used as a “warrant for favoritism” that might prevent employers 
from treating pregnant workers “as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant 
employees”). 
 128. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs did not 
identify a particular practice susceptible to disparate impact analysis); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 
F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a lack of a part-time option is not an “employment 
practice” subject to disparate impact challenge); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 
583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that disparate impact theory cannot be used to challenge legitimate job 
requirements like attendance). 
 129. See, e.g., Maganuco v. Layden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991); Lang v. 
Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308 (8th Cir. 1997) (treating employee’s claim that the employer was too small 
for statistical analysis as a concession that “there is no evidence . . . of a disproportionately adverse 
impact on pregnant women”); Ilhart v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (refusing, in disparate 
impact case challenging the elimination of a part-time position, to take notice of studies showing that 
the majority of part-time workers are women with child-care responsibilities). 
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impact theory cannot be used at all in pregnancy discrimination cases.130  While 
courts have not gone so far as banning such claims outright, they have been far 
from receptive to them.  For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Stout v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., refused to apply disparate impact theory to claims “in which the 
plaintiff’s only challenge is that the amount of sick leave granted to employees is 
insufficient to accommodate the time off required in a typical pregnancy.”131  “To 
hold otherwise would be to transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave 
for pregnant employees, something we have specifically held that the PDA does 
not do.”132  Recent attacks on disparate impact theory in general, even outside of 
the pregnancy context,133 make it even less likely that this doctrine will fill in the 
gaps created by courts’ narrow approaches to proving discrimination because of 
pregnancy under the PDA. 
With clause one of the PDA mostly relegated to protection for pregnant 
workers from being penalized for the status of pregnancy, workers seeking to 
reconcile the demands of paid work with the effects of pregnancy have turned to 
clause two of the PDA for recourse.  On its terms, clause two should extend to 
workers affected by pregnancy the most favorable treatment given other workers 
with conditions having a similar effect on work.  Here too, however, courts have 
turned the PDA into a weak rule against animus targeting the status of 
pregnancy per se. 
B. Trouble in Clause Two: A Return to the Sui Generis Treatment of Pregnancy 
While the courts have not done particularly well with clause one, the 
biggest problems in the PDA case law in recent years have come by way of 
clause two.  In what appears to be a growing trend, courts have undercut 
pregnant workers’ rights under clause two by carving out exceptions from the 
classes of workers to which pregnant women may compare themselves. 
A major focus in recent PDA litigation has been the validity of workplace 
policies that provide for light-duty assignments for some workers, but not for 
women with pregnancy-related limitations.  These policies do not expressly 
exclude pregnancy, but use criteria that render pregnancy ineligible.  For 
example, a typical light-duty policy offers light-duty assignments only for 
workers with injuries sustained on-the-job.  For the most part, women 
challenging light-duty policies have been unsuccessful unless they are able to 
 
 130. See, e.g., Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol.Dist., 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988). In an 
amicus brief, the United States argued that the PDA’s mandate of equal treatment was intended to 
“eliminate the need for employees to rely on disparate impact analysis to support their Title VII 
claims,” but also to preclude such reliance where it might be helpful.  Id. at 978. 
 131. 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 132. Id. See also Sussman v. Salem, 153 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (“This Court recognizes the 
Supreme Court’s opinion that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was not intended to provide 
accommodations to pregnant employees when such accommodations rise to the level of preferential 
treatment.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that an employer who rejected 
results of an employment test because it feared disparate impact litigation was liable for unlawful 
disparate treatment); See also id. at 594-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that disparate impact 
doctrine itself might be subject to constitutional challenge for denying the equal protection rights of 
non-beneficiaries). 
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show discriminatory intent.  Instead of following the plain language of clause 
two, requiring pregnant workers to be treated as well as other workers “similar 
in their ability to work,” lower courts are increasingly applying the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to search for discriminatory intent behind the policy.134 
The decision to apply the pretext framework in these cases, instead of a 
straightforward comparative right to accommodation for pregnant workers, is 
compounded by additional hurdles courts set up for plaintiffs.  For example, 
courts have held that light-duty plaintiffs have failed to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination because a woman with an off-the-job injury was not 
“qualified” for light-duty policy that only applied to on-the-job injuries.135 This 
reasoning effectively bars pregnant workers from challenging light-duty policies 
under the PDA.  Courts have also cut short light-duty challenges on the grounds 
that the pregnant plaintiff could not identify a similarly situated worker who 
received the benefit she was denied—the fourth prong of the prima facie case 
under McDonnell Douglas—since no other off-duty injuries were treated better.136 
Even if plaintiffs survive the prima facie stage, courts accept the policy itself as 
the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying the light-duty 
request.  When courts allow the rule to defend itself, as they have done in these 
cases, they deny the plaintiff the opportunity even to offer evidence of 
discriminatory intent—which, we contend, courts should not have been looking 
for in the first place. This approach is especially damning when it insulates a 
formal policy that will continue to have an impact on other pregnant women, 
rather than an isolated instance of disparate treatment. 
A typical light-duty case is Reeves v. Swift Transportation Co. Amanda Reeves 
was an over-the-road truck driver for Swift Transportation.137  When Reeves 
applied for the job, she represented that she could lift seventy-five pounds (sixty 
 
 134. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green laid out a proof structure to be used 
in cases when the plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination primarily through circumstantial evidence.  
See 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Courts could also undertake mixed-motive analysis, first recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and later codified with 
modifications by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012), in 
which case plaintiffs would have to prove that pregnancy was “a motivating factor” in adoption of 
the policy or its application. 
 135. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
with respect to the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test: “There is no dispute that Appellant 
was no longer qualified to work as a nurse’s assistant. The lifting restriction imposed on Appellant 
clearly prevented her from performing the responsibilities required of this position.”) See also 
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 
F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the district court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to show 
she was “qualified for transfer into a light-duty position, i.e., that she sustained a work related 
injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 136. See Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208; see also Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (noting, with respect to the fourth 
prong of McDonnell Douglas, that the “correct comparison is between Appellant and other employees 
who suffer non-occupational disabilities, not between Appellant and employees who are injured on 
the job”). But see EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.7 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“If a plaintiff is compared only to non-pregnant employees injured off the job, her case would be 
‘short circuited’ at the prima facie stage . . . . The better approach would be to hold that a plaintiff has 
satisfied the fourth element of her prima facie case by showing that she was treated differently than a 
non-pregnant, temporarily-disabled employee.”). 
 137. 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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over her head) and carry it for fifty-six feet.138  After three months on the job, 
Reeves discovered she was pregnant.  She had never, up to that point, had to 
unload a truck herself or carry anything heavy.139  Her doctor wrote a note 
restricting her to light work, which included lifting no more than twenty 
pounds.140  Her supervisor reviewed the note, declared they had no “light work” 
for her to do, and sent her home.141  She requested light work daily – and was 
repeatedly denied based on the company’s policy that light work could only be 
assigned to those disabled by on-the-job injuries.142  The company eventually 
fired her for failing to work at full capacity.143 
In her PDA lawsuit, Reeves argued that the light-duty policy was per se 
discriminatory because no pregnant woman could qualify for light work 
regardless of whether her level of incapacity was the same as workers who did 
qualify.144  The court rejected this theory and turned, instead, to the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, which asks first for proof by the plaintiff of a prima facie 
case of discrimination, then for the production of evidence by the employer 
pointing to a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.145  It 
assumed that Reeves had met her prima facie burden, and then considered 
whether Swift’s ostensibly legitimate explanation—its “pregnancy blind” light-
duty policy—was a pretext for discrimination.146  The court granted summary 
judgment to Swift because Reeves could not prove that Swift adopted the policy 
in order to disadvantage pregnant women.147 
Pregnant plaintiffs have managed to prevail in two light-duty cases.  In 
Lochren v. Suffolk County, female police officers won a jury trial in their challenge 
to a light-duty policy with an on-the-job restriction.148  But here, the plaintiffs had 
evidence of longstanding and persistent animus against female officers and the 
inconsistent application of the ostensibly neutral light-duty policy.149  The same 
county was sued again a few years later by female park police officers, 
challenging an identical policy, resulting in a favorable settlement for the 
plaintiffs.150 
 
 138. Id. at 638. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 639. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Reeves had only worked for the employer for three months and thus did not meet the 
eligibility requirements for FMLA leave.  Id. 
 145. See  McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 146. Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641-42.  The court did not take Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th 
Cir.1996), head on because it limited its comparison-group analysis to the pretext stage of the case.  Id. 
at 641 n.1. 
 147. Id. at 641-43. 
 148. See Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925(ARL)., 2008 WL 2039458 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 
2008); see also Joanna Grossman, A Big Win for Pregnant Police Officers: A Jury Finds a New York 
County’s Police Department Liable for Failing To Accommodate Pregnancy-Related Disability, FINDLAW’S 
WRIT (June 27, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20060627.html (describing the jury 
verdict in Lochren v. Cnty of Suffolk). 
 149. See Grossman, supra note 148. 
 150. Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk., 672 F. Supp. 2d 319 (2009). 
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Even when plaintiffs prevail, as they did in Lochren, the winning theory has 
been based on an unduly narrow reading of clause two.  The Lochren plaintiffs 
prevailed only because they mustered strong evidence of longstanding and clear 
animus against female police officers generally, and pregnant police officers in 
particular.151 But the second clause of the PDA is meant to guarantee equal 
treatment regardless of an employer’s motive. 
By defining the comparison pool for pregnant workers to exclude a favored 
class of workers (such as those injured on the job), courts construe pregnant 
workers’ requests for light-duty work as a demand for “special treatment.”152  
While there is some earlier authority rejecting this kind of approach to PDA 
claims challenging pregnant workers’ exclusion from light-duty work,153 in 
Reeves and like cases from other circuits, the plaintiff’s claim is characterized as a 
demand for “preferential treatment.”154  Under this approach, the employer can 
select any comparison group by which to establish that the pregnant woman has 
received equal treatment as long as the choice does not reflect a discriminatory 
motive.  By permitting the employer to pick and choose among comparably 
disabled workers, the court fundamentally misconstrues clause two of the PDA, 
which by its terms entitles pregnant women to work on the same terms as more 
favorably-treated workers similarly restricted in their capacity to work. 
Two recent cases, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.155 and Serednyj v. Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC,156 illustrate how this approach is now effectively nullifying the 
second clause of the PDA. 
Peggy Young was hired by UPS in 1999.157  She began driving a delivery 
truck for the company in 2002.  As an “air driver,” charged with delivering 
 
 151. See Grossman, supra note 148. 
 152. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Swift 
Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 153. The leading case rejecting this kind of parsing of comparators under clause two of the PDA is 
Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for employer 
because district court had incorrectly limited the class of “similarly-situated” employees to those also 
injured off-the-job); accord Villanueva v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc.,  No. Civ.A. 04–258–JJF., 
2007 U.S. Dist. WL 188111, at *5 n.4 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2007) (holding that pregnant patient care 
technician who was denied light duty established a prima facie case even though her medical 
restrictions differed from those of employees granted light duty); Sumner v. Wayne Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 
2d 822, 826 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that a police officer fired for violating department’s no-leave 
policy for probationary employees after taking time off to give birth was “similarly situated” to male 
officer granted longer probationary period after sick leave for on-the-job injury; both were 
“temporarily disabled while on probation”).  See also Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy 
Discrimination at Work: Interpreting the PDA To “Mean What It Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703, 724-33 (2001) 
(defending the reasoning of Ensley-Gaines as grounded in the text and legislative history of the PDA). 
However, the same Circuit that decided Ensley-Gaines later indirectly critiqued its reasoning in Reeves.  
See Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 154. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Appellee, however, 
was under no obligation to extend this accommodation to pregnant employees. The PDA does not 
require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employees.”) (emphasis added); Urbano 
v. Cont’l Airlines, 138 F.3d at 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Urbano’s claim is thus not a request for relief from 
discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential treatment; it is a demand not satisfied by the 
PDA.”) (emphasis added). 
 155. 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 156. 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 157. 707 F.3d at 440. 
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packages that came via air rather than ground delivery, Young typically carried 
lighter letters and packs.  Young’s job description, however, required her to be 
able to lift and maneuver packages weighing up to 70 pounds, and assist with 
movement of packages up to 150 pounds.158  Young was covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA), which required UPS to provide temporary, light-
duty work assignments to employees who could not perform their regular jobs 
due to an on-the-job injury.159  The CBA also extended light-duty work to drivers 
who are legally prohibited from driving because they either failed a required 
medical exam or lost their driver’s license.160  Beyond the requirements of the 
CBA, UPS had a policy to permit light-duty assignments when “an employee has 
a qualifying disability within the meaning of the ADA which prevents him/her 
from being able to perform some aspects of his/her job.”161  Because women with 
pregnancy-related disability do not fall into any of these categories,162 they are 
“permitted to continue working as long as they wanted to during their 
pregnancies, unless and until the employee presented a doctor’s note or other 
medical certification that she had a restriction that rendered her unable to 
perform the essential aspects of the job.”163 
Young sought and received several short-term leaves of absence as she went 
through three rounds of in vitro fertilization.164  When she finally became 
pregnant during the third round, her doctor wrote a note recommending that she 
lift no more than 20 pounds during the first half of her pregnancy and no more 
than 10 pounds thereafter.165  The company decided that it could not allow her to 
continue working since she was not capable of performing the lifting described 
in the list of essential job functions for her position.166  Young had already used 
up all available medical leave, so she was put on a leave of absence with no pay 
and no medical coverage.167  She returned to work two months after giving birth 
in 2007.168 
Young filed a lawsuit with claims for sex and pregnancy discrimination.  
The court rejected Young’s argument that it facially discriminated against 
pregnant employees by excluding pregnancy from eligibility for light-duty 
assignments.169  Because the policy is “pregnancy-blind” and offers 
accommodations on the basis of “gender-neutral criteria,” the court refused to 
 
 158. Id. at 439. 
 159. Id. at 439-40. 
 160. Id. at 440. 
 161. Young v. U.P.S., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, at *5-6 (D. MD Feb. 14, 2011). 
 162. Courts have consistently interpreted the ADA to exclude normal pregnancy as a covered 
disability.  See, e.g., Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting 
that “the majority of federal courts hold that pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a 
disability under the ADA”); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 474 (D. Kan. 
1996). 
 163. Young, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. 
 164. Young, 707 F.3d at 440. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 441. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 442. 
 169. Id. at 446-47. 
Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:24 AM 
92 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 21:67 2013 
treat the policy as facially discriminatory or as raising an inference of pregnancy 
discrimination.170 
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis and concluded 
that Young did not establish that she met the fourth element of the prima facie 
case – that a “similarly situated employee” was treated differently.171  Although 
the company’s policies accommodated a wide range of conditions, from high 
blood pressure and diabetes to drunk driving convictions, the court ruled that 
Young could not use anyone who was eligible for ADA accommodation or had 
lost their legal ability to drive as a comparator in the PDA claim.172  There is no 
similarity, the court explained, between a driver who suffers “from a legal 
obstacle to their operation of a vehicle” and a woman whose pregnancy poses “a 
physical impairment that stymied her ability to lift.”173  The court dismissed 
without discussing the possibility that an employee entitled to accommodation 
under the ADA could be an appropriate comparator for Young.174  The court 
effectively read a requirement of pregnancy-based animus into clause two: 
It is important here to recall the objective of this element of the prima facie case: to 
discern whether a reasonable inference can be drawn that the employer has 
animus directed specifically at pregnant women.  When an employer grants 
pregnant employees and some class of non-pregnant employees equally harsh 
terms, it undermines such an inference.  In such circumstances, an employer 
might have some form of animus that is not to be applauded, but the animus is 
not directed towards a protected trait and, consequently, is not actionable.175 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as well as 
its reasoning.176  Despite acknowledging that the second clause of the PDA “can 
be read broadly,” it chose not to give it such effect.177  The court expressly 
rejected the idea that the second clause of the PDA creates “a distinct and 
independent cause of action.”178  The court rejected what it saw as the 
transformation of “an antidiscrimination statute into a requirement to provide 
accommodation to pregnant employees, perhaps even at the expense of other, 
nonpregnant employees.”179 
Another recent case, Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, adds to the trend to 
effectively nullify clause two.180  Victoria Serednyj was employed as an activity 
director in a nursing home beginning in August 2006.181  As with many jobs in 
long-term care facilities, Serednyj’s stated job duties included “some physically 
 
 170. Id. at 450. 
 171. Young v. U.P.S., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, at *37-42 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 
2011). 
 172. Id. at *38-42. 
 173. Id. at *40. 
 174. Id. at *38-40. 
 175. Id. at *41. 
 176. Young v. U.P.S., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 177. Id. at 447. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 448.  Young filed a petition for certiorari, which has not yet been ruled upon. 
 180. 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 181. Id. at 545. 
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strenuous functions”—such as walking, climbing, bending, and lifting—related 
to transporting residents to their activities, rearranging furniture, and shopping 
for supplies.182  Her typical workday, however, involved only miniscule amounts 
of time on such tasks, and coworkers often helped her with them.183  Serednyj 
learned she was pregnant in January, 2007, and began to experience pregnancy-
related complications soon thereafter.184  After a two-week stint on bed rest, 
Serednyj’s doctor restricted her to light duty work.185  The company’s policy was 
to provide light-duty accommodations only to individuals with a disability 
under the ADA or an on-the-job injury.186  Beverly Healthcare denied her request 
for light duty, notwithstanding the proclaimed willingness of her coworkers to 
help out.187  Because she had not worked for the company long enough to qualify 
for leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, she was fired.188 
The court considered both the mixed-motive and pretext models for 
proving discrimination in denying the PDA claim.189  Rejecting the argument that 
the light-duty policy was itself direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, the 
court ruled that the policy “complies with the PDA because it does, in fact, treat 
nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant employees—both are denied an 
accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries.”190 
The reasoning in these cases, legitimizing any differential accommodation 
of workers that can be explained on a pregnancy-neutral basis, effectively 
collapses clause two of the PDA into clause one.  The result is to make it virtually 
impossible for pregnant workers to challenge the more favorable treatment of 
other groups of workers with conditions that have a similar effect on work.  The 
effect on pregnant workers’ PDA rights has become even more draconian as a 
result of recent amendments to the ADA, which have expanded the pool of 
workers entitled to accommodations under the ADA. 
C. The Expanded ADA and the Contracting PDA 
In an odd confluence of poorly-reasoned PDA cases and a well-intentioned 
congressional override of restrictive judicial interpretations of the ADA, recent 
developments in disability law are now exacerbating the problems created by the 
PDA cases discussed above.  The ADA provides that individuals with a 
“disability” who are “otherwise qualified” have the right to reasonable 
accommodations that do not impose an undue hardship on the employer.191  A 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 545-46. 
 186. Id. at 546. 
 187. Id.at 545-46. 
 188. Id. at 546-47. 
 189. Id. at 547-52. 
 190. Id. at 548.  The court’s implicit assumption that a mixed-motive challenge requires “direct 
evidence” of discrimination is itself bizarre, since the Supreme Court rejected any direct evidence 
requirement for proof of a discriminatory “motivating factor” under the 1991 Amendments to Title 
VII.  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 91, 102 (2003). 
 191. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.”192  While this directive might itself seem like a 
good fit for pregnant workers whose pregnancies or related conditions require 
reasonable accommodations in order for them to continue to work, courts and 
the EEOC have consistently refused to regard normal pregnancy as an 
“impairment” under the Act.193 The more troubling development for pregnant 
workers, however, is that the recent expansion of ADA rights combined with the 
trend in the PDA cases is now adding to the hurdles facing pregnant workers 
seeking to secure accommodation rights through the PDA. 
In 2008, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act (ADAAA), in response to a number of Supreme Court decisions taking a 
restrictive view of the scope of the ADA.194  The Amendments expand the 
definition of “impairment” to include not only conditions that interfere with 
“activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives,” but also 
more routine, work-related tasks such as standing, lifting, or bending.195 The 
EEOC regulations interpreting the Act state that an impairment “need not 
prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a 
major life activity,” and that the “substantially limits” requirement is “not meant 
to be a demanding standard.”196  As an example of an impairment that would 
qualify for reasonable accommodations under the Act, the EEOC’s interpretive 
guidance describes someone with a “20-pound lifting restriction that lasts or is 
expected to last for several months.”197 
The ADAAA, as interpreted by the EEOC, should also lift the duration 
requirements many courts had imposed on the definition of disability.  Although 
the statute never specified a minimum period of disability, nor required it to be 
permanent or indefinite, many courts had imposed a requirement of permanence 
or long-term impact under the ADA.198  The ADAAA, like the original ADA, 
does not explicitly address duration, but the EEOC has interpreted its mandate 
for “broad coverage” to mean that short-term disabilities may be covered.  In one 
 
 192. Id. at § 12102(2)(A). 
 193. EEOC, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630 app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (1991); see also Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (collecting cases where the court has refused to acknowledge pregnancy as a physical 
impairment). 
 194. Among the decisions overruled are Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471(1999); 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 196. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1991). 
 197. EEOC, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630 app. § 1630 (2012). 
 198. Courts considered duration of the disability as a factor in determining whether it substantially 
limited a major life activity.  See, e.g., Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Evans v. 
City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Jonathan R. Mook, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS § 902.4(d) (2013) (“Although short-term, temporary 
restrictions generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not necessarily have to be 
permanent to rise to the level of a disability.  Some conditions may be long-term, or potentially long-
term, in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be at least several months.  
Such conditions, if severe, may constitute disabilities . . . despite the prognosis for full recovery at 
some indeterminable point in the future.”). 
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“rule of construction,” the regulations provide that the “effects of an impairment 
lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting,” 
and therefore may qualify as an “impairment.”199  The ADAAA also modified 
other aspects of the standard to enlarge the class of individuals covered.200 
One thing that has not changed with the ADAAA, so far at least, is the 
exclusion of normal pregnancy under the Act, despite its even more comfortable 
fit with the expanded coverage to encompass short-term disabilities, even those 
which only manifest as a lifting restriction.  Nevertheless, the EEOC, in an 
interpretive guidance of the ADAAA, continues to adhere to the position that 
normal pregnancy is not a disability and need not be accommodated under the 
ADA.201 
In addition to perpetuating the exclusion of workers impaired by pregnancy 
and related conditions from any right to accommodation directly under the 
ADA, the amendments are also (unintentionally) interfering with pregnant 
workers’ accommodation rights under the PDA.  Although the ADAAA should 
help pregnant women by creating an expanded class of persons entitled to 
workplace accommodations to whom pregnant workers could compare 
themselves, cases like Reeves,202 Young,203 and Serednyj204 instead make pregnant 
women worse off by eliminating an even broader class of comparators. 
The reasoning of these courts, that ADA accommodations are not 
comparable since they are required by law, defies the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Guerra.205  The Court’s alternative ruling in that case forbade employers from 
hiding behind another statutory mandate as an excuse to treat one group of 
comparably disabled workers better than another in violation of the PDA.206  As 
the Court explained, California employers who were forced to provide maternity 
leave by state law still could have complied with the PDA, had the Court 
interpreted it to require non-pregnancy disabilities to be treated as well as 
pregnancy, by extending leave and reinstatement rights to both groups.207  
Likewise, employers should not be able to hide behind the ADA to excuse a 
refusal to give pregnant women the same accommodations if they are similar in 
their ability to work.  The employer’s motive for offering accommodations to one 
group but not another has no proper place in courts’ analysis under clause two, 
 
 199. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012). 
 200. For detailed discussion of the changes, see Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the 
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 460-66 (2012) (addressing the expanded 
scope of the ADA).  See also Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 964-65 
(2013); Williams et al., supra note 105, at 20-30. 
 201. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. at 378 (2011) (failing to include pregnancy as an impairment in 
the ADA). 
 202. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 203. Young v. U.P.S., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 204. Serednyj v. Beverly Health Care, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 205. Cal. Fed. Savings v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 206. See id. at 291 (explaining that compliance with both federal and state law is possible and thus 
one law does not trump the other). 
 207. Id. at 290-91. 
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which makes similarity in ability to work the only relevant factor.208 
Part of the resistance to comparing pregnant workers to workers 
accommodated under the ADA may be an implicit, but unwarranted, distinction 
in the presumed duration of ADA-qualified disabilities compared to pregnancy, 
a temporary condition.  Courts have generally construed the ADA to exclude 
temporary disabilities, at least prior to the changes brought about by the 2008 
Amendments.  Although the text of the PDA does not impose any kind of 
duration requirement on a worker’s inability to work in extending similar 
treatment to pregnant women, terminology analogizing pregnancy and related 
conditions to temporary disabilities has crept into the PDA lexicon.  The early 
EEOC regulations, some of the legislative history behind the PDA, and some 
court opinions describing the PDA have all explained the Act as extending to 
pregnancy the same level of benefits and accommodations as are available for 
other temporary disabilities.209  In viewing ADA-accommodated disabilities as 
not comparable to pregnancy, courts may be surreptitiously limiting the scope of 
the PDA’s clause two, making pregnancy comparable only to temporary 
conditions.  This kind of slicing and dicing of the class of comparators whom 
courts will analogize to pregnant workers–e.g., limiting the class of comparable 
workers to those with only temporary conditions—is part and parcel of the 
overly restrictive reading courts are giving clause two of the PDA. 
The PDA itself, however, does not tie pregnant workers’ treatment to that of 
workers with only temporary disabilities, but rather, to workers who are similar 
in their ability to work.  A natural reading of that language would focus on 
present work capacity, and would include workers with similar capacity at the 
time accommodations/benefits are given, regardless of the expected duration of 
their impairment.  For example, a person with multiple sclerosis and a person 
with a temporarily strained back might both be proper comparators, if similar to 
a pregnant worker in ability to work. 
In our view, the legislative history’s comparison of pregnancy to other 
temporary disabilities should not, and never was intended to, exclude 
comparisons to disabilities of permanent or indefinite duration.  Rather, 
references to temporary disabilities were made because, at the time the PDA was 
enacted, temporary disabilities were the kinds of conditions employers were 
accommodating.210  Until passage of the ADA, workplaces generally made few if 
 
 208. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (“women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes. . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”). 
 209. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972) (“Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy for all 
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such. . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 
948(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 (“The EEOC Guidelines . . . require employers to 
treat disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth and 
recovery therefrom as all other temporary disabilities.”); 29 C.F.R. 1604 app. Question 5 at 200 (2013) 
(Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act) (“An employer is required to treat an 
employee temporarily unable to perform the functions of her job because of her pregnancy-related 
condition in the same manner as it treats other temporarily disabled employees, whether by 
providing modified tasks, alternative assignments, disability leaves, leaves without pay, etc.”); see 
Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-41 (1976) (quoting temporary disability language from EEOC 
Guidelines). 
 210. See Widiss, supra note 200, at 986-88 (discussing the expansion of employer benefits for 
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any provisions for workers with lasting disabilities who required 
accommodations to continue work.211  When the PDA was conceived, to the 
extent employers were doing anything for disabilities, so as to enable pregnant 
workers to use them as a benchmark for comparison, it was through policies on 
temporary disabilities, such as the plans at issue in both Geduldig and Gilbert.212  
Those plans, which excluded pregnancy, gave leaves of a limited duration, and 
accompanying reinstatement rights, designed to accommodate workers with 
temporary disabilities. In drafting and enacting the PDA to overturn these 
decisions, the primary focus was on the kind of fact pattern at issue in these 
cases, as evidenced by Congress’ choice of language.213  The PDA came to be 
described as a mandate to treat pregnancy as well as other temporary disabilities 
because those were the kinds of conditions at the time that employers were 
treating more favorably.  Just like Gilbert drove the terminology used in the PDA, 
the Gilbert fact pattern shaped descriptions of the PDA’s impact in highlighting 
the analogy to temporary disabilities. 
But the text of the PDA is not so limited. The plain language of the PDA 
makes an employee’s ability to work the only reference point for drawing 
comparisons. And of course, saying that the Act mandates treating pregnancy as 
well as temporary disabilities in no way implies that pregnancy may be treated 
worse than disabilities that are not temporary.  Now that employers must, by 
law, make reasonable accommodations for disabilities of greater duration, the 
PDA, by design, should extend equal benefits and accommodations to pregnant 
workers with a similar work capacity.  The courts that are now refusing to allow 
pregnant workers to compare themselves to ADA-accommodated workers may 
be, incorrectly, locked into a default categorization of pregnancy as only 
analogous to temporary disabilities, unduly narrowing the class of appropriate 
comparators. 
To the extent that the default restriction of comparators to only temporary 
disabilities has been limiting courts’ views of the proper scope of PDA rights, 
and blocking comparisons to ADA-accommodated disabilities, that particular set 
of blinders should be lifted now that the 2008 Amendments have clarified that 
ADA accommodations are required for temporary as well as more lasting 
impairments.214  So far, however, the extension of the ADA to temporary 
disabilities has not made a difference in how courts view the PDA in relation to 
the ADA.  In the cases discussed above, courts have refused, with little or no 
analysis, to use ADA-mandated accommodations as a baseline for pregnant 
workers similar in ability to work, despite the 2008 Amendments.  Instead, they 
insist on characterizing policies to accommodate ADA-qualified disabilities and 
on-the-job injuries, but not pregnancy, as “pregnancy neutral,” since not based 
 
workers with temporary disabilities, except for pregnancy, which was often excluded, during the 
years leading up to enactment of the PDA). 
 211. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 Ga. 
L. Rev. 27, 42-63 (2000) (detailing the history of discrimination against disabled persons, to which the 
ADA was responding). 
 212. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486-89; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128. 
 213. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra (pointing out that the terms defined in the PDA do 
not appear elsewhere in Title VII, but do appear in the Gilbert decision). 
 214. See text accompanying notes 198-200 supra. 
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on animus against pregnant workers. 
The upshot is that courts are effectively draining clause two of any content, 
and failing to see that in continuing to separate pregnancy from a class of other 
conditions, even broader since 2008, similarly affecting work, they are 
resuscitating the very gender ideology about pregnancy and work at the heart of 
the Gilbert decision that the PDA sought to override.  The next section takes a 
step back to explore how the PDA cases fit into broader trends in employment 
discrimination law, and delves into the gender ideology behind the 
developments in the PDA case law. 
III. PUTTING THE PDA’S FAILURES INTO A BROADER LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Taking a step back, the problems courts have created in the PDA case law 
resonate with the troubles of discrimination law more generally.  The doctrinal 
failures of the PDA share some common themes with the rest of discrimination 
law.  And yet, while the PDA’s fault-lines have antecedents in the broader law of 
discrimination, the PDA’s failings nevertheless stand out, in light of the statute’s 
text and history.  Their emergence in the PDA case law reflects a distinctive 
gender ideology about pregnancy and work, and by extension, motherhood and 
work. 
A. Amplifying the Anti-Plaintiff Trends in Employment Discrimination Law 
One point of overlap between the PDA and other areas of employment 
discrimination law is a resistance to so-called “bootstrapping” – using logic and 
principled reasoning to apply the law to an area that the legislature had 
specifically intended to exclude.  The anti-bootstrapping flag gets raised often in 
discrimination law – perhaps most prominently in cutting short the reach of 
gender stereotyping theory to ensure that sexual orientation discrimination 
remains outside the boundaries of a claim for sex-based discrimination.  While 
acknowledging that the logic of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,215 which recognized 
gender stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination, may encompass negative 
reactions to a gay or lesbian employee for failing to conform to the expectations 
for how a “real” man or woman should conduct their sex life, courts have 
insisted that Congress did not intend to address sexual orientation 
discrimination when it enacted Title VII.216  Accordingly, they reason, it is 
necessary to preserve a line between sex and sexual orientation bias in order to 
prevent this kind of bootstrapping of claims.  A similar fate has befallen pay 
discrimination claims under Title VII’s disparate impact claim. Because Congress 
never intended to mandate comparable worth, courts have cut short employees’ 
ability to use disparate impact claims to challenge pay disparities, seeing these 
claims as heading down a slippery path that might end in comparable worth.217 
 
 215. 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989). 
 216. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 
F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination applies only to 
gender discrimination and does not include discrimination of homosexuality). 
 217. See, e.g., Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Ill., 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the association 
had no cause of action based solely on comparable worth, but that intentional discrimination 
sufficient to state a sex discrimination cause of action had been alleged). 
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Similarly, the recent PDA decisions, discussed above, reject what the courts 
see as bootstrapping accommodations for pregnant workers onto the legs of the 
ADA.  Under this reasoning, since Congress never intended the PDA to 
affirmatively guarantee any set level of benefits or accommodations, such as paid 
maternity leave or sick leave to pregnant workers, and since Congress intended 
to exclude normal pregnancy from the disabilities covered by the ADA, using the 
expanded ADA to achieve equivalent results would be tantamount to 
bootstrapping the claims of pregnant women onto the framework of the ADA.  
This interpretation of the PDA, as a blank slate that does not in itself guarantee 
substantive benefits for pregnancy, reflects an over-simplified, reductionist view 
of the feminist movement behind the PDA.  As Deborah Dinner has shown, 
feminists actually pursued a more substantive and progressive agenda in 
pushing for the Act than the more hollow “formal equality” commonly 
attributed to the law’s supporters.218 
By invoking the bootstrapping label, courts can halt the reach and logic of 
discrimination law without acknowledging the ideology or policy choices behind 
their decisions.219  The invocation of bootstrapping saddles the plaintiff with an 
activist, sleight-of-hand litigation tactic while the judge plays the role of neutral 
guardian of legislative intent.  Closer inspection of the anti-bootstrapping move, 
however, reveals that it is itself a substantive choice.  The logic of statutory 
language often extends beyond the specific intentions of the legislature, as Justice 
Scalia recognized in the Oncale decision,220 when that Court held that Title VII 
reaches male-male sexual harassment despite Congress’s lack of intent to 
regulate such conduct when it enacted Title VII.  The bootstrapping flag is raised 
selectively, masking interpretive choices.  A similarly false fidelity to legislative 
intent was espoused in Gilbert itself, wherein the Court purported to be 
constrained by Congress’ traditional understanding of sex discrimination.221  A 
recent article by Cary Franklin shows how that “traditional” understanding was 
itself an invention, masking normative choices in interpreting the meaning and 
scope of the statute’s prohibition.222 
The question of which substantive values and policy choices underlie the 
bootstrapping objection merges into a second shared theme in the PDA and the 
rest of discrimination law: judicial resistance to using discrimination law in a 
way that appears to enforce accommodation mandates.  The liberal equal 
treatment model that dominates discrimination law in the U.S. aspires to deliver 
only the same treatment for similarly situated persons, stopping short of 
 
 218. On this history, see generally Dinner, supra note 22 (unearthing the more complicated feminist 
history behind the PDA than the liberal feminist agenda of minimizing the significance of pregnancy 
in relation to work and rejecting “special” treatment for women). 
 219. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205 (2009) (exposing 
how courts’ resistance to bootstrapping masks a double standard that selectively raises sexual 
orientation—gay/lesbian  orientation, but not heterosexual orientation—as a bar to recognizing a 
claim of gender stereotyping). 
 220. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 221. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137-40 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 222. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1307, 1358-66 (2012). 
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requiring any structural changes that would enable the members of protected 
groups to thrive.  In specifying discrete protected classes, discrimination law 
identifies certain status-based identity characteristics that may not be used to 
deny equal treatment.  Clause one of the PDA recognizes pregnancy as such a 
status.  The judicial tilt towards formal equality is so strong in U.S. law that 
clause two’s express accommodation mandate—requiring pregnancy to be 
accommodated to the same extent as other disabilities with a similar effect on 
work—is effectively being read out of the statute.223 
Judicial hostility to accommodation mandates runs deep and pervades U.S. 
discrimination law.224  It underlies the stinginess of the disparate impact claim, 
the courts’ minimalist approaches to religious accommodation under Title VII, 
and most notably, the courts’ narrow interpretations of what counts as a 
disability under the ADA.225  Indeed, it was the Supreme Court’s strict 
interpretation of the ADA, including its narrow view of what counts as a 
qualified disability, which led Congress to amend the statute in 2008.226  The 
recent PDA decisions, refusing to allow employees entitled to accommodations 
under the ADA to be used as comparators for pregnant women under the PDA, 
reflect the same kind of resistance to accommodation norms that precipitated the 
ADAAA in the first place. 
A third theme evident in the PDA case law, and shared by discrimination 
law generally, is that “discrimination” is equated with a conscious intent to 
disadvantage the protected group.  As discussed above, recent court decisions 
have turned the PDA, including clause two, into a search for animus.  The clause 
two cases are especially notorious for this.  By rejecting comparisons to ADA-
qualified disabilities in applying clause two, courts have made the reason for 
denying accommodations to pregnant workers the key to winning the claim.  
Our review of PDA cases decided between January 1, 2009 and June 29, 2012, 
found that the cases in which the plaintiff survived summary judgment and/or 
motions to dismiss were, overwhelmingly, cases that fit an animus model.227  We 
 
 223. See text accompanying notes 135-90 supra. 
 224. A number of commentators have acknowledged this hostility in the courts, but made 
convincing arguments that the traditionally-conceived dichotomy separating accommodation claims 
from the rest of discrimination law is a false one.  See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001) (critiquing the sharp doctrinal distinction between 
antidiscrimination and accommodation, and arguing that the costs imposed by each are equivalent); 
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004) (discussing similarities between the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirements and other discrimination laws); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party 
Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 
1386-1404 (2009) (discussing the third-party harasser claim as an unacknowledged form of a failure to 
accommodate claim, and criticizing the artificial distinction between nonaccommodation and other 
recognized discrimination claims). 
 225. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 55 (2009) (discussing views of ADA critics claiming a strong distinction between the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate and other discrimination laws); Karen Engle, The Persistence of 
Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 
357-406 (1997) (discussing judicial resistance to Title VII’s requirement that employers reasonably 
accommodate religious practices). 
 226. See Cox, supra note 200, at 461-62 (outlining the amendments to the ADA coverage). 
 227. See Memorandum from RA (on file with authors).  Our research searched for PDA claims 
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found 59 cases in which plaintiffs prevailed.  Almost all of these involved claims 
under clause one, where plaintiffs alleged adverse actions taken on the basis of 
pregnancy, despite the plaintiff’s continuing ability to do the job.  In more than 
half of these winning cases, the plaintiff had what might be called “direct” 
evidence of animus, such as an admission that pregnancy was the reason for the 
adverse treatment or disparaging comments from a supervisor or manager 
referencing the pregnancy. 
Much has been written about the conflation of discrimination with animus, 
and the PDA is by no means unique in trending toward an “insular 
individualism” as the prototype for what amounts to actionable 
discrimination.228  The Supreme Court’s recent employment discrimination cases 
– Ricci v. DeStefano,229 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,230 and Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes231 – conceive of unlawful discrimination as stemming from a 
conscious intent to treat persons worse because of their status as members of a 
protected class.  In these and other cases, institutional bias in the structure of the 
workplace that disadvantages women or persons of color does not register as 
discrimination. 
Against this backdrop, the appearance of these themes in the PDA case law 
might be viewed as predictable, if not inevitable.  However, when considered in 
light of the text and history of the PDA, the infiltration of these crosscurrents into 
the PDA case law is rather stunning.  That these tensions have cropped up in the 
PDA cases says something about the resilience of the gender ideology behind 
pregnancy discrimination. 
While common to discrimination law generally, these three themes—
resistance to bootstrapping, hostility to accommodation mandates, and requiring 
proof of animus—are rebuked by a plain-meaning reading of the PDA itself.  
Clause two of the PDA explicitly ties the treatment of pregnant workers to the 
treatment of non-pregnant workers similar in their ability to work. There is no 
room in this language for exempting ADA-covered disabilities, or any other 
conditions with a similar effect on work, from this comparison.  There is no 
bootstrapping needed to put pregnant workers on an equal footing with other 
workers, receiving accommodations, who have a similar capacity to work; it is 
done in one step, through the statute’s text.  Judicial hostility to mandating 
accommodations must be strong enough to overcome the literal language of 
clause two.  Likewise, reducing PDA violations to a search for animus is also 
incompatible with the language of that clause.  Clause two makes the different 
treatment of pregnancy, compared to other conditions similarly affecting work, a 
violation of the Act.  The violation does not hinge on the reason for denying that 
treatment to pregnant workers.  Unlike the arguably more ambiguous “because 
of” pregnancy language in the first clause, which is parallel to the entry point for 
 
using Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law databases, decided between January 1, 2009 and June 29, 
2012. 
 228. See Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (2008) (discussing the insular individualism in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear and the potential consequences on antidiscrimination law). 
 229. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 230. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 231. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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an animus approach in the rest of discrimination law, clause two defines 
discrimination as the unequal treatment of pregnancy and other conditions 
similarly affecting work, regardless of the reason.  The fact that lower courts 
have nevertheless gravitated toward an animus approach to the PDA is therefore 
striking, and reveals the staying power of the ideology embedded in Gilbert. 
B. The Gender Ideology in the PDA Case Law 
The spreading of these three themes into the PDA case law despite the text 
of clause two reflects a deep-seated ambivalence about the regulation of 
pregnancy in the workplace.232  U.S. culture is marked by a long and continuing 
history of ambivalence about working mothers.  Pregnancy marks the beginning 
of that ambivalence, and brings with it its own set of projected associations.  Iris 
Marion Young eloquently captured the way cultural depictions of idealized 
pregnancy erase the agency of pregnant women, characterizing the dominant 
image of pregnancy as “a time of quiet waiting” in which the woman is 
“expecting,” “a time of waiting and watching, when nothing happens.”233  In this 
account, the presumptive incompatibility between the woman’s pregnancy—a 
passive and objectified state—and her active engagement with work is implicit. 
In recent years, ambivalence about working mothers has taken the form of 
hyped-up stories that amplify and glorify trends of women leaving the labor 
force to devote more time to mothering.234  The gender ideology underlying these 
stories is in synch with the gender ideology behind the refusal to accommodate 
pregnancy in the workplace.  Asking the question of whether pregnancy should 
be accommodated implicitly assumes non-pregnant workers as the norm.  
Pregnancy is cast as a special liability, an impediment to work, which 
foregrounds the reproductive role of the pregnant subject.  The question of 
whether and how to accommodate pregnancy at work triggers descriptive and 
prescriptive stereotypes about how pregnancy and motherhood do and should 
affect women’s attachment to the labor force. 
The gender ideologies behind pregnancy discrimination, though loaded 
with stereotypes, make for a bad fit with the animus model of discrimination.  
Cultural ambivalence about working mothers is masked by an overlay of 
reverence for pregnancy and motherhood, with an idealized white motherhood 
occupying a central place in popular consciousness.  Carol Sanger highlighted 
the complicated meaning of motherhood when she pointed out that motherhood 
 
 232. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Price She Pays, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 815 (2012) (discussing 
cultural ambivalence toward working mothers). 
 233. IRIS MARION YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: ‘THROWING LIKE A GIRL’ AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 54 (2005). 
 234. For a summary of recent pieces in the popular press on this theme, see A. Joan Saab, Creating 
a Life or Opting Out: Antifeminism and the Popular Media, 8 J. ASSOC. FOR RES. ON MOTHERHOOD 233 
(2006). For a counterpoint to the so-called “opt-out” trend, see LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A 
MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD (2006).  Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote a controversial essay in 
which she proclaimed it virtually impossible for women to really “have it all.”  See Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have it All, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-
all/309020/. 
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is simultaneously “both revered and regulated.”235  It is also pegged as “normal” 
for women—both descriptively, in that the vast majority of women do become 
mothers, and prescriptively, in the stigma and questioning that surrounds 
women who remain childless throughout their lives.236  As Katherine Franke 
observes, maternity is so normalized for women that women who do not become 
mothers are seen as cultural anomalies, and even “unnatural” women.237  In this 
complicated stew, it is not obvious what animus toward pregnancy looks like.  
Ambivalence about working mothers is clothed with reverence toward 
pregnancy, at least for women whose reproduction is highly valued.  For these 
women, there is no animus towards pregnancy per se, but a glorification of 
pregnancy, along with an anticipated elevation of the maternal role over other 
(and presumably competing) roles. 
Indeed, much cultural discourse glorifies motherhood, depicting it as an 
empowered state showcasing women’s fierceness and determination to protect 
and nurture their young.  The “mama grizzly” is a newly resurgent iconic ideal, 
in which women are lionesses protecting, developing, and hovering over their 
young.238  In this narrative, women are the superior parents, sharply contrasting 
with the ineptitude of men in domestic realms.  The mama grizzly role is 
portrayed as one chosen by women, and so outside the structures of the separate-
spheres ideology of old.239  The constraints that shape this “choice,” however, are 
left unexplored. 
Gender ideologies lionizing mothers in the maternal sphere may complicate 
the search for animus against pregnant workers, but they do not actually 
enhance the appeal of women as workers or protect them from discrimination.  
Quite the contrary. Implicit in this duality of parenting (the ultra-competent 
mama grizzly versus the caring but bumbling dad) is that the woman’s maternal 
zeal is reserved for the children, with little leftover for other endeavors.  
Women’s fierceness and determination in this ideal is located firmly within 
separate spheres ideology; it does not give women added competence in the 
workplace or make them more valuable as employees.240 
Social science research suggests that ambivalent reactions to combining 
work and motherhood translate into pregnancy-based bias in the workplace.  
Although there is not as much empirical research on pregnancy discrimination as 
one might expect, the research that has been done finds pregnancy to be a likely 
 
 235. Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 15, 17 (1992). 
 236. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 372 n.28 (citing census data showing that only 18% of 
women will not have given birth by their 44th birthday). 
 237. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 181, 185 (2001) (“Reproduction has been so taken for granted that only women who are not 
parents are regarded as having made a choice—a choice that is constructed as nontraditional, 
nonconventional, and for some, non-natural.”). 
 238. See Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
229, 250-53 (2010) (describing mothers as protectors). 
 239. See id. 
 240. See, e.g., Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 
1297, 1306 (2007) (discussing research showing conflict between intensive mothering norms and 
perceptions of competence at work). 
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trigger for bias.241  One study contrasted the reactions of retail store employees to 
pregnant customers with their reactions to pregnant job applicants.242  Store 
workers were more likely to respond benevolently to pregnant customers (with 
overly-friendly responses, affirming touches and affectionate but diminutive 
references like “honey” and “sweetie”), but hostilely to pregnant applicants.243  A 
follow-up study found that reactions to pregnant applicants were especially 
hostile when women applied for masculine-typed jobs.244 Other studies have 
found that pregnant women are rated as less competent and less suited for 
promotion than non-pregnant workers performing the same work, are less likely 
to be recommended for hire, and receive lower salary recommendations.245  One 
researcher has coined the term “pregnant presenteeism” for the phenomenon of 
pregnant workers seeking to compensate for employer bias by presenting 
themselves as healthy and remaining at work even when they are unwell.246  This 
literature finds that, rather than presenting in the form of animus or dislike, 
reactions to pregnant women are ambivalent, situational and role-dependent. 
While not specific to pregnancy per se, an even more robust body of research 
documents a motherhood penalty in the workplace, which suggests that 
impending maternity is also likely to trigger stereotyping and bias.  In one study, 
for example, subjects received a pair of resumes featuring equally qualified 
applicants of the same gender and race, differing only by parental status.247  
Subjects in the study judged the mothers in the pairs as “significantly less 
competent and committed than women without children.”248  Not only did the 
subjects’ views of women’s competence vary by maternal status, they also 
recommended lower starting salaries for the women, but not men, who were 
 
 241. For two early, foundational studies documenting pregnancy-bias in the workplace, see Jane 
A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a source of bias in performance appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649 (1993) 
(finding substantial negative stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in significantly more 
negative performance appraisals of pregnant workers, especially by male reviewers) and Sara J. 
Corse, Pregnant Managers and their Subordinates: The Effects of Gender Expectations on Hierarchical 
Relationships, 26 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 25 (1990) (finding pregnant managers were penalized when 
they acted firmly, in a conflict situation, instead of conforming to expectations that pregnant women 
are more empathetic and nurturing). 
 242. Michelle R. Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: 
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 1499 (2007). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1508-09. 
 245. See Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on Hiring Decisions 
and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497 (2007); Bragger et al., The Effects of the Structured Interview on 
Reducing Biases Against Pregnant Job Applicants, 46 SEX ROLES 215 (2002); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the 
Maternal Body: A Comprehensive Review and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98-
100 (2011); Barbara Masser et al., ‘We Like You, But We Don’t Want You’—The Impact of Pregnancy in the 
Workplace, 57 SEX ROLES 703 (2007) (discussing similar findings in an Australia-based study); Liisa 
Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related Discrimination and Leader-follower Relationships, 19 
GENDER, WORK & ORG. 677 (2011) (discussing similar findings in a Finnish study). 
 246. Caroline Jane Gatrell, ‘I’m a bad mum’: Pregnant presenteeism and poor health at work, 72 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 478 (2011). 
 247. Correll, supra note 240, at 1308 (the pairs were of either white women or African American 
women, to account for the possible influence of race on a motherhood bias). 
 248. Id. at 1316. 
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parents.249  The subjects held mothers to higher performance standards and 
punctuality requirements and actually gave them less leeway for being late to 
work than they gave fathers and non-parents.250  A follow-up, companion study 
of actual employers, in which equally qualified mothers and non-mothers 
applied for jobs, found that childless women received twice as many callbacks as 
mothers, despite having equally strong resumes.251  Another study found that 
professional working women who became mothers were perceived as more 
warm, but less competent, than women without children and men with 
children.252  Professional working fathers, in contrast, were perceived as warmer 
and more competent after becoming parents.253  Subjects in this study had less 
interest in hiring, promoting or training mothers compared to fathers and 
childless workers.254  Other research confirms these findings, showing mothers 
evaluated more harshly and treated less leniently than fathers.255  These findings 
are consistent with research documenting a per-child wage penalty of about five 
percent for employed mothers in the U.S.256 
So far, we have been discussing biases surrounding pregnancy and 
maternity as if they were monolithic and applied the same to all women.  But 
gender ideologies surrounding work and motherhood have always been 
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) racialized.257 Young’s depiction of 
pregnancy as a passive, waiting state, for example, represents an implicitly white 
ideal of pregnancy.  Women of color historically have been both less revered 
while pregnant and presumed to be less in need of protection from the rigors of 
work.  Tales lionizing mothers and celebrating their supposed “opt-out” rights 
map onto an unarticulated but racially and economically specific ideal mother.  
As A. Joan Saab explains in describing the assumptions underlying Danielle 
Crittenden’s discourse blaming “feminism” for misleading women into thinking 
they can have both motherhood and a career, Crittenden’s “average woman is 
white, middle class, and for the most part a fiction.”258 As Saab explains, the 
“feminism” in the opt-out literature is oblivious to “the important issues of race, 
class, gender, and sexual identity that feminist theorists and activists have spent 
the past ‘30-odd years’ addressing.”259 
The narratives about motherhood and work, including those about 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1327-30. 
 252. Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 701, 701 (2004). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 711-12. 
 255. Kathleen Fuegen, et al. Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental Status 
Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748-49 (2004); Cecilia L. Ridgeway 
& Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 683 (2004). 
 256. Correll, supra note 240, at 1297. 
 257. See generally Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of 
Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 257 (1999) (discussing 
race and the ideal mother). 
 258. Saab, supra note 234, at 236. 
 259. Id. at 238. 
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pregnancy and work, do not apply alike to all mothers.  For mothers whose 
reproduction is tagged as socially valuable, pregnancy marks a revered state that 
precedes a socially prized role for women. Women of color, unmarried women, 
and economically vulnerable women have often triggered different reactions 
when they become pregnant.260  They are more likely to be viewed as 
irresponsible reproducers, and are expected to work, while at the same time are 
predicted to be less reliable workers.  In the study discussed above, in which 
reviewers evaluated same-race, same-gender pairs, African American mothers 
were rated as less likely to be promoted than their equally qualified white 
maternal counterparts.261 Consistent with this ideology, researchers investigating 
how gender stereotypes affect working mothers have found that white mothers 
are viewed more positively if they stay home with their children, while African 
American mothers are viewed more positively if they work.262  At the same time, 
however, African American women are more likely to be stereotyped as 
unreliable workers after becoming mothers.263 
Women of color, single women, and economically vulnerable women who 
must navigate the cultural fault-lines for working mothers are susceptible to 
charges of being bad mothers, irresponsible for having children at all, or for 
having too many children.264  At the same time, they are expected to continue 
working without “special” accommodation, a sentiment reflected in the harsh 
judgments reserved for “welfare mothers” who are dependent on state 
support.265  These mothers are burdened not by a stereotypically protective 
chivalry ushering them out of the workplace as much as an insistence that they 
work unimpaired and unaffected by pregnancy and motherhood.  And yet, here 
too, the gender ideology behind the refusal to accommodate pregnancy in the 
workplace does not easily map onto a conscious animus seeking to keep women 
out of the workplace upon becoming pregnant.  The gender ideology here insists 
that they stay in the workforce, even as it suspects that they may not be able to 
meet employer expectations. 
While there is no single, universal gender ideology targeting pregnancy and 
maternity at work, the animus model is a poor fit for everyone—for women who 
approximate the maternal ideal as well as the many who do not.  For the 
pregnant woman who fits the idealized portrayal of passive waiting in Iris 
Marion Young’s account, there is not animus towards pregnancy as much as a 
prioritization of her maternal role.  But the flip-side of this is the diminished 
 
 260. Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 379-81(1996). 
 261. Correll et al., supra note 240, at 1324.  The researchers noted that the other motherhood 
penalties studied—recommendations to hire and salary recommendations—were not significantly 
affected by maternal race, and emphasized that both groups of women studied, white and African 
American, experienced the motherhood penalty.  Id. 
 262. See Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO. J. 
POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 1, 39-40 (2012) (discussing studies) [hereinafter Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder]. 
 263. Id. 
 264. For an insightful discussion of African American women’s history of having their 
relationships with their children devalued and severed, see generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW  PROFESSOR 216 (1991) (presenting stories of African 
American women’s vulnerability to having their children taken away from them); see also McClain, 
Irresponsible Reproduction, supra note 260 (critiquing the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction). 
 265. CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 378-79. 
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value placed on her paid work.  For women who do not fit Young’s ideal, who 
are expected to work without complaint throughout their pregnancies, there is 
not (usually) animus against their staying in the workplace.  Rather, they are 
expected to stay without “special” treatment, but likely to confront assumptions 
that having children will interfere with their work ethic and performance. 
Neither combination (valuing motherhood while devaluing work, or devaluing 
motherhood while valuing work) presents itself neatly as the kind of pregnancy-
based antipathy that the courts are searching for in applying the PDA.  As a 
result, ideologies about gender, race and maternity continue to deprive pregnant 
women of the accommodations many will need to perform their jobs throughout 
pregnancy. 
The gender ideology behind pregnancy discrimination, including the denial 
of accommodations for pregnant workers, is largely an ideology about women, 
but there is a gender ideology about men here too.  As masculinities scholars 
remind us, no examination of gender injustice is complete without asking “the 
man question”: what masculinity is behind this?266  The flip-side of resistance to 
accommodating pregnant women at work is an assumption that pregnant 
women are (or should be) partnered with a male breadwinner.  While mothers 
bear a wage-penalty, fathers as a group benefit from a wage bonus—reflecting a 
conception (again, implicitly raced) of fatherhood as entitling (privileged) men to 
a family-wage.267  This idealized, race/class-specific masculinity is implicit, 
though unarticulated, in the devaluation of pregnant workers compared to other 
workers with similar restrictions on work ability. 
Indeed, the very terminology surrounding work and motherhood 
presupposes a male breadwinner in the background.  Martha Chamallas has 
unpacked the cultural meaning of the word “mother” in explaining that the 
unmodified “mother” evokes a married woman who is partnered with a male 
earner and whose primary identity is her maternal role.268  She explains how the 
modifiers tell a revealing story: “unmarried mothers” and “single mothers” are 
common objects of conversation, usually with the suggestion of a social problem 
in the making.269  One very rarely hears the term “married mother”— because 
left unmodified, the mother’s marital status is presumed.270  Likewise, there is no 
male counterpart to the “working mother”; the “working father” is not often 
found in the work-family lexicon.271  It is assumed that men combine work and 
parenthood; a “father” is presumed to engage in paid work and needs no 
modifier to signal his status as a worker.272  The masculinity that supports the 
 
 266. See generally NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 
(2010) (exploring masculinities scholarship and how it can better feminist legal theory).  For a 
discussion of the need to engage men and masculinity to rebalance caretaking responsibilities, see 
generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 
(2010). 
 267. Correll et al., supra note 240, at 1307-08. 
 268. CHAMALLAS, supra note 66, at 367. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
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unmodified mother is the privileged masculinity of the male breadwinner.273 
Likewise, the masculinity that supports the narrow scope of the PDA is the 
ideal male wage-earner who can support a family on his salary and pick up the 
slack if his pregnant wife has to stop working.  This traditional masculinity has 
historically been restricted to white men from the middle- to upper- classes.274  In 
this ideal, the man’s reproductive and parenting roles not only present no 
conflict with work, his work is secure enough for him to become the sole 
provider, at least for a while.275  His labor force attachment is not expected to 
wane with parenthood—unlike the mother’s, which is expected to do so (a 
presumption likely to become self-fulfilling if she loses her job while 
pregnant).276 
But as is often the case, this idealized masculinity is just that—it does not fit 
most peoples’ reality.277  There are fewer than ever two-parent households that 
can support a family with only one working parent.  Lower-income families are 
especially far from this ideal.  Among households in the bottom third of family 
incomes, over 25% of married fathers are unemployed or work only part-time.278  
Even a full-time employee working forty hours a week all year long, with no 
time off, earning minimum wage will have an annual income of only $15,080.279  
At this rate, even families with two full-time workers earning minimum wage 
will struggle to make ends meet.  For many families, whether a woman is able to 
work through pregnancy can make the difference between continuing to survive 
economically and falling off the deep end.  And of course, many families do not 
have two parents in the household.  A large proportion of low-income families 
are headed by single mothers.280  The ideal masculinity that is constructed by 
employer refusals to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace is based on a 
fictional account of prescriptive gender roles, not the reality of most workers’ 
lives. 
The increasingly hostile PDA case law reflects not so much a problem with 
 
 273. Id. at 367-68. 
 274. See Joan C. Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of 
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 89, 122-23 (1998) (noting the difficulties of men of 
color, especially African American men, to meet the standard of masculinity defined by the income); 
see also Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wisc. J. L. Gender & Soc’y 201 239-
40 (2008) (on the elusiveness of breadwinner masculinity for black men). 
 275. This ideal has become an increasingly poor fit with most men’s lives.  See Ann C. McGinley, 
Crowdsourcing the Work-Family Debate: A Colloquy: I; Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 Seattle 
Univ. L. Rev. 703, 709, 714 (2011). 
 276. Cf. Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 63 
HASTINGS L. J. 1297 (2012) (discussing gender stereotypes about ideal fatherhood and masculinity that 
penalize men who seek to modify their work lives to accommodate caretaking obligations as fathers). 
 277. For example, Joan Williams has pointed out that men in blue collar jobs actually do much 
more child care and housework than men in professional, white collar jobs, even though they are 
often reticent about it.  WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE, supra note 266, at 59. 
 278. Joan C. Williams & Heather Boushey, The Three Faces of Work-Family Conflict: The Poor, the 
Professionals, and the Missing Middle (Jan. 2010), at 13, available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf. 
 279. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 6 (citing economic data). 
 280. Id. at 16.  See also TIMOTHY S. GRALL, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 
2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf 
(stating that four-fifths of all single parents living with children are women). 
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the statute itself as the resilience of gender ideologies surrounding maternity, 
work, and (implicitly) masculinity.  A court’s answer to the question of whether 
discrimination occurred depends in part on its baseline expectations about what 
a nondiscriminatory world would look like.281  Presumptions and prescriptions 
about women’s attachment to the workforce, the comparative value of women’s 
maternal roles and work roles, and women’s attachment to male breadwinners 
infuse judicial understandings of what pregnancy discrimination looks like, and 
accordingly, when and why courts recognize it. 
IV. WHICH WOMEN LOSE THE MOST? LOOKING AT THE PDA THROUGH THE LENS OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM 
The PDA’s failure to accommodate pregnant women and new mothers 
leaves many working women with stark and unappealing choices: live up to 
unrealistic work expectations for as long as possible, often with significant risk to 
maternal or fetal health, or be forced out of a job.282  Despite the popularity of 
stories foregrounding the work-life “balance” struggles of mostly privileged, 
professional women, the women most vulnerable to work-pregnancy conflicts 
are the least privileged workers.  This has always been a downfall of the PDA, 
with its failure to mandate paid leave or affirmatively guarantee any substantive 
protections for pregnant women.283  While the scope of the PDA was limited 
from the outset, the law’s failings have come into sharper relief as courts have 
found new ways to undermine analogies to workers with other kinds of 
conditions that employers are accommodating. 
The PDA has always held the most promise for women working for 
generous employers, those that have flexible leave and benefits.  These women 
have the most to gain from the PDA’s prohibition on treating pregnant women 
worse than other workers with conditions similarly affecting work.  Lower-wage 
workers are more likely to work for stingier employers, who do little to nothing 
 
 281. Cf. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 
GEO. L. J. 279 (1997) (arguing that it is not the intent standard itself as much as judges’ worldviews 
about the ongoing existence of discrimination that drives the results in discrimination cases); Katie R. 
Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
1275 (2012) (discussing social psychology research finding that beliefs about meritocracy and the 
prevalence or rarity of discrimination greatly influence peoples’ perceptions of discrimination). 
 282. See, e.g., Gatrell, supra note 245 (challenging the belief that pregnant employees are prone to 
take sick leave). 
 283. Low-wage workers are much less likely than higher-paid workers to work for employers that 
offer maternity leave, sick leave, vacation leave, or any kind of personal leave that would give 
employees paid time off for pregnancy and childbirth.  See Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 
262, at 10 (noting that, of workers in the bottom wage quartile, only 23% have any paid sick days, and 
that “[a]lmost 70% of all lower-income workers have two weeks or less of sick and vacation days 
combined”); see also Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-8 (2007) (citing disparities between professional employees and lower-wage 
workers in access to leave); see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WORKING WOMEN NEED 
PAID SICK DAYS 1, 1 (Oct. 2012) (“[e]ighty-two percent of workers making $8.25 per hour or less don’t 
have access to paid sick days.”).  Cf. Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy 
Discrimination and Social Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker’s Right to Job-Protected, Paid 
Leave, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 126-27, n. 33 (2009) (discussing California’s bolder approach to 
protecting pregnant workers, in which proponents of mandating leave made their case by focusing 
on the needs of the most economically vulnerable women). 
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for any worker, thus giving pregnant workers the right to only the same poor 
treatment under the PDA.284 However, as employers have extended more 
generous treatment to certain classes of workers—as required by law for disabled 
workers under the ADA, or through collective bargaining agreements or 
voluntarily for workers with on-the-job injuries—pregnant workers should 
benefit under a proper reading of the PDA.  The trends discussed above in the 
PDA case law are particularly harmful to lower-wage and economically 
vulnerable women.  These are the women whose pregnancies are most likely to 
come into conflict with their work environments.285  They are also the women 
who need the law the most, and who are now faring the worst under the PDA 
case law.  And they can least afford the lost pay that results when such conflicts 
force them out of a job. 
A recent case from the Seventh Circuit, Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.,286 illustrates just how badly the PDA is failing economically vulnerable 
workers.  Svetlana Arizanovska worked three days a week for Wal-Mart as a 
stocker on the overnight shift.287  Her duties included “finding items for her 
assigned areas and placing the items on the shelves.”288  Because stocking may 
involve lifting heavy items, Wal-Mart requires its stockers to be able to lift 50 
pounds.289  Arizanovska’s first pregnancy while working at Wal-Mart ended in 
miscarriage.290  When she became pregnant a second time, her doctor restricted 
her from lifting more than ten pounds.291  Arizanovska informed Wal-Mart of the 
restriction and asked to be assigned job duties that would accommodate this 
restriction, such as folding clothes.292  Wal-Mart replied that no such position 
existed, since persons folding clothes also had stocking duties, and placed her on 
 
 284. See National Women’s Law Center, It Shouldn’t Be a Heavy Lift: Fair Treatment for Pregnant 
Workers (2013), at  6-7, at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers.pdf 
(noting the inflexibility of employers in low-wage jobs). 
 285. Id. at 1, 3, 5.-7 Cf. Amy Armenia & Naomi Gerstel, Family leaves, the FMLA and Gender 
neutrality: The Intersection of Race and Gender, 35 SOC. SCI. RES. 871, 874 (2005) (discussing research 
finding that “relatively privileged workers—especially those working in large organizations, with 
salaried rather than waged jobs, or union members—are in a better position to negotiate” with their 
employers to get their needs met). 
 286. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012).  Since the court’s decision 
was a ruling on the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the description of the facts in this 
article is based on the plaintiff’s version of facts. 
 287. In addition to working the overnight shift at Wal-Mart on Friday, Saturday and Sunday 
nights, the plaintiff also worked for another company from 10:30 am – 7:00 pm, Mondays through 
Fridays, packing and shipping medicines.  Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107405, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2011).  The plaintiff’s relentless work schedule itself speaks 
volumes about lower-wage workers’ need to work through pregnancy as a matter of economic 
security. 
 288. Id. at *2. 
 289. Id. at *4. 
 290. The plaintiff experienced conflicts at work during her first pregnancy too.  While under 
medical supervision for spotting and bleeding, Arizanovska informed her supervisor at Wal-Mart 
that her doctor had told her not to lift more than 20 pounds.  While her supervisor initially 
accommodated this restriction by assigning her to the baby food and toothbrush aisles, the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisor soon assigned her back to an aisle that required heavier lifting.  
Arizanoska miscarried shortly thereafter.  Id. at *4-5. 
 291. Id. at *5. 
 292. Id. 
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an involuntary leave of absence.293  Once again, Arizanovska’s pregnancy ended 
in miscarriage.294  This time, she sued Wal-Mart under the PDA.295 
Importantly, the court emphasized that Wal-Mart’s response was consistent 
with its policy on employee accommodations—a policy that on its face treats 
pregnancy on a different footing than disabilities that must be accommodated 
under the ADA.296  The court’s opinion includes the following excerpt from Wal-
Mart’s Accommodation in Employment Policy: 
If you have a medical condition that is not a disability, but which prevents you 
from performing your job, including pregnancy, you may be eligible for a job aid 
or environmental adjustment under this policy, a leave of absence under the 
Leave of Absence Policy, or you also may request transfer to another open 
position under the Associate Transfer Policy. . . .297 
The policy goes on to tightly restrict the circumstances under which a 
worker covered under the policy is eligible for an accommodation: 
Job aid or environmental adjustment means a change in practices or the work 
environment which is both easily achievable and which will have no negative 
impact on the business.  This type of accommodation does not include creating a 
job, light duty or temporary alternative duty, or reassignment.298 
In contrast, accommodations required by the ADA may, in some cases, 
include light duty, temporary alternative duties and/or reassignment.299 
Yet despite the divergence between accommodations for pregnancy and 
ADA-qualified disabilities under the policy, the court found Wal-Mart’s policy 
unproblematic under the PDA.300  The court began by faulting the plaintiff for 
failing to identity a non-pregnant, similarly situated employee who was treated 
more favorably.301  While this requirement is not necessarily objectionable, much 
depends on the determination of who counts as similarly situated.  The court’s 
implicit acceptance of Wal-Mart’s policy suggests that only “non-disabled” 
workers seeking accommodation are similarly situated to pregnant workers for 
purposes of the PDA.  The court described the sought-after comparators as 
 
 293. Id. at *5-6. 
 294. Id. at *7. 
 295. 682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 296. Id. at 702-03. 
 297. Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 701. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that 
the ADA requires reasonable accommodation of an employee with a disability to a vacant position to 
which he seeks to transfer). 
 300. In theory, the court left room for challenging the policy in some other case, pointing out that 
the plaintiff’s claim proceeded “only under the indirect proof method,” as opposed to using the 
“direct” method.  Arizanovska, 682 F.3d at 702.  Accordingly, the court apparently viewed the plaintiff 
as having foregone a direct challenge to the policy itself as facially discriminatory on the basis of 
pregnancy.  Id. at 703 (dismissing plaintiff’s argument as “really a challenge to the policy itself,” and 
“not applicable when proving a discrimination case under the indirect method”).  However, for the 
reasons discussed below, the court’s reasoning nevertheless implicitly rejects such a challenge.  
Moreover, the court’s sharp divide between “direct” and “indirect” methods of proof serves only to 
limit the scope of clause two, which makes no such distinction. 
 301. Id. at 702. 
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having “temporary medical restrictions that prevented them from doing their job 
duties.”302  As discussed above, the reflexive and unwarranted limitation of 
comparators to those with only temporary disabilities led the court to implicitly 
exclude comparators with more lasting disabilities.  In expressly differentiating 
pregnant workers from disabled workers in the policy, the company may have 
been operating under (again, unwarranted) implicit associations of pregnancy 
with only temporary conditions and ADA-disabilities with more permanent 
ones.  As discussed above, this kind of parsing defies both the 2008 Amendments 
(which reject durational limits on disabilities) and the text of the PDA (which 
speaks only of similarity in work capacity, not duration of disability). 
Having so narrowed the class of proper comparators, and without proof of 
a more favorably-treated “similarly situated” comparator, the court regarded 
Wal-Mart’s refusal to accommodate Arizanovska as an even-handed, non-
animus based application of the store’s accommodation policy, which it 
described as “consistent with Title VII’s requirements.”303  On that point, the 
court cited Serednyj, one of the PDA decisions previously discussed.  The 
Arizanovska decision thus further entrenches the obliteration of clause two in the 
recent PDA case law. 
So construed, the PDA allows employers to deny workers such as 
Ariznovska—those in highly structured workplaces with broadly applicable and 
inflexible rules—even modest accommodations as long as the employer’s reason 
for doing so does not appear as pregnancy-based animus.  As a class, the 
workers most affected by this are the most economically vulnerable. 
Workers in physically demanding jobs, including police work, firefighting, 
construction jobs and factory work (especially if it involves exposure to 
chemicals or other safety hazards), will likely face conflicts with work at some 
point during pregnancy.  Many employers for such jobs do not voluntarily do 
much to accommodate pregnancy.  Police departments, for example, have been 
criticized for routinely denying requests for maternity uniforms and off-street or 
otherwise modified duties, and for lacking maternity leave policies.304  Many 
jobs, such as Ariznovska’s stocking job, have lifting requirements that create 
conflicts with pregnancy.  Workers in these jobs may require alternative, light-
duty assignments to be able to work through pregnancy. 
Other jobs may not be physically demanding, but take place in highly 
regulated, inflexible work environments.  For example, Stephanie Bornstein, 
discussing the conflicts facing mothers at the lower end of the wage scale, notes 
that one-third of lower-wage workers cannot choose their break times.305  
Pregnant workers needing breaks to go to the restroom or drink water would 
need minor accommodations in such work environments in order to do so.  In 
 
 302. Id. (emphasis added). 
 303. Id. at 703. 
 304. See Corina Schulze, Institutionalized Masculinity in U.S. Police Departments: How Maternity 
Leave Policies (or Lack Thereof) Affect Women in Policing, 23(2) CRIM. J. STUD. 177 (2010). 
 305. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 9; see also Liz Watson & Jennifer Swanberg, 
Flexible Workplace Solutions for Low-Wage Hourly Workers: A Framework for a National Conversation, 
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY, May 2011, at 19 (“between 40% and 50% of low-wage hourly workers 
report. . .being unable to determine when to take breaks while at work.”). 
Brake-Growssman Proof 2 (Do Not Delete) 2/18/2014  11:24 AM 
 UNPROTECTED SEX 113 
one lawsuit against Wal-Mart seeking such an accommodation, a woman who 
monitored fitting rooms alleged that she was fired for insubordination for 
carrying a water bottle in accordance with her doctor’s orders to drink water 
throughout the day.306  As it is now being interpreted, the PDA fails to provide 
pregnant workers with even such minor accommodations as permission to drink 
water on a shift and extra restroom breaks.  These kinds of conflicts between 
pregnancy and work are especially pronounced in lower-wage jobs.307 
Pregnant workers in low-wage jobs are especially vulnerable to refusals for 
accommodations, even as some of their co-workers (such as those with on-the-
job injuries or ADA-qualified disabilities) are extended accommodations.  In 
denying accommodations for pregnancy (while extending them to others), 
employers treat pregnant workers as fungible and not worth even the (often) 
minimal costs it would take to keep them.  This itself reflects an ideology that 
devalues pregnant workers and new mothers in lower-wage jobs.  In Bornstein’s 
survey of cases compiled in a database by the Center for WorkLife Law at the 
U.C-Hastings College of Law, she found that “the cases reveal an extreme 
hostility to pregnancy in low-wage workplaces, including workers fired on the 
spot or immediately after announcing a pregnancy, pregnant employees banned 
from certain positions no matter what their individual capabilities to do the job, 
and workers refused even small, cost-effective adjustments that would allow 
them to continue to work throughout their pregnancies,” and even some 
instances where pregnant workers were told by their supervisors to get 
abortions.308  Bornstein also found a harsher pattern of treatment for pregnant 
women of color, who were denied accommodations routinely granted to other 
pregnant workers.309 
Courts’ restricted interpretation of what counts as a condition “related” to 
pregnancy, and what it means to “discriminate” against such conditions under 
clause one, also harms economically vulnerable workers.  Breastfeeding, for 
example, is more likely to conflict with work in more rigidly structured 
workplaces.  Lack of time to express milk, lack of a private place to do so, lack of 
storage facilities, and lack of support from supervisors and/or coworkers are 
common obstacles to continuing to breastfeed while working.  Research on the 
economic effects of breastfeeding has found that mothers who breastfeed for six 
months or longer suffer more severe and more prolonged earnings losses than 
 
 306. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 2168911, at *2 (D. Kan. July 21, 
2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s FMLA claim, where plaintiff alleged that under store policy, only 
cashiers could have access to a water bottle while they worked, and that she was fired for violating 
the policy). 
 307. Cf. Paula McDonald et al., Expecting the worst: circumstances surrounding pregnancy 
discrimination at work and progress to formal redress, 39 INDUS. REL. J. 229, 237 (2008) [hereinafter 
McDonald, Expecting The Worst] (discussing results of a study of 318 cases of pregnancy 
discrimination in Australia, finding that most cases occurred in occupations lower on the 
occupational ladder, such as sales/personal service work and lower-skilled administrative workers, 
and that “far fewer women who reported pregnancy-related problems in their workplaces worked in 
relatively more privileged jobs such as managers/administrators. . . or professionals. . .”). 
 308. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 5.  See also Gatrell, supra note 245, at 104-05 
(reviewing literature on pregnancy discrimination and class indicating that working class mothers 
are as likely to experience unfair treatment while pregnant as managers). 
 309. Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262, at 5. 
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mothers who formula feed.310  Lower-income workers are less able to bear these 
costs.  There is also a racial dimension to how the law allocates the costs of 
breastfeeding.  Researchers have long known that white women are more likely 
than Black women to breastfeed.311  Although little is known about why, it may 
well be that Black women are less able to bear the economic costs of 
breastfeeding and more likely to work in jobs that are less amenable to 
accommodating it.  What limited research there is on work and breastfeeding 
suggests that women in lower-paid jobs, who are disproportionately women of 
color, have less access to the kinds of privacy and flexibility that it takes to 
sustain breastfeeding while working.312 Lower-earning women also face 
disproportionately greater burdens when dealing with other aspects of 
reproduction, such infertility and the treatment of it, as well.313 
For many workers, pregnancy discrimination is the first block in the 
maternal wall.  It is difficult for women’s careers to recover from not working 
through pregnancy.  Gaps in the labor force during pregnancy lead to longer 
absences from the workforce, which may become self-reinforcing.314  When 
women are forced out of a job due to conflicts with pregnancy and related 
conditions, along with reduced labor force attachment comes increased parenting 
and domestic responsibilities – and a growing competence gap in domestic 
responsibilities between women who have given birth and their partners, a gap 
that also becomes self-reinforcing.315  Especially for the most economically 
vulnerable workers, conflicts between maternity and work are not just a quality-
of-life issue of “balance,” but a core issue of economic security.316 
V. WITHER THE PDA(?): DISABILITY AND SEX EQUALITY 
Recently, voices from within the legal academy have charted a path to 
address pregnancy discrimination under the ADA, particularly in light of the 
more expansive definition of disability codified in the 2008 Amendments.  Law 
professor Jeannette Cox has argued that the social model of disability, which 
focuses on the relationship between the body and the work environment (as 
opposed to a more narrow medical view that locates disability in bodily 
abnormality), encompasses pregnancy.317  She criticizes what she sees as the 
 
 310. Phyllis L.F. Rippeyoung & Mary C. Noonan, Is Breastfeeding Truly Cost Free? Income 
Consequences of Breastfeeding for Women, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 244, 244 (2012). 
 311. Id. at 246, 254; Gattrell, supra note 245, at 106. 
 312. Gattrell, supra note 245, at 106 (reviewing literature on the race and class dimensions of 
accommodating breastfeeding at work). 
 313. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Infertility, Social Justice, and Equal Citizenship, in GENDER 
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 327, 333-43 (2009). 
 314. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL 
IDEAL 41 (2007) (noting that even brief absences from the work force have longer-term negative 
effects on women’s economic prospects). 
 315. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 57, 75 (2012) (describing how the market reinforces men’s diminished caretaking role). 
 316. See Bornstein, Bottom of the Ladder, supra note 262 (outlining the struggle between the 
necessity of employment and the need to support a household). 
 317. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012). 
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feminist movement’s distancing of pregnancy from disability and urges feminist 
legal scholars to embrace the social model of disability and its applicability to 
pregnancy.318  Sounding a similar theme, law professor Sheerine Alemzadeh also 
makes a case for applying the ADA to pregnancy.319  She too questions the 
feminist legal community’s historic reticence about the ADA’s exclusion of 
pregnancy and criticizes the current distinction the ADA attempts to draw 
between “normal” and “abnormal” pregnancy.320  Like Professor Cox, her focus 
is on how pregnancy interacts with the work environment, regardless of the 
appropriate medical terms. 
These promising arguments for using the ADA to seek accommodations for 
pregnant workers raise questions about the ongoing need for the PDA and 
whether it may have outlived its usefulness, at least in those cases where 
accommodations are sought.  This question has echoes of earlier debates about 
whether a gender-specific or a more universal approach is the best model for 
addressing pregnancy and the conflicts pregnant women face in the current 
social structure.  In the 1980s and into the 90s, this controversy consumed reams 
of paper in the legal journals and split the feminist legal community.321  The 
premise of the controversy, at least in the beginning, was that a choice between 
the two strategies was necessary.322  At this point in history, however, that 
premise should not be taken for granted.  Of course, the particular question 
about whether to require “special treatment” (a pejorative and contested label) 
for pregnancy through the PDA was settled in favor of the law’s equal treatment 
approach, even though the Supreme Court interpreted the law in Guerra to 
permit (but not require) state laws mandating pregnancy-specific protections.323  
The question feminists might ask now is the distinctly different one of whether 
the PDA, an explicitly feminist legal strategy that uses a sex discrimination 
framework, or the ADA, a gender-neutral disability model, is the way to go to 
seek legal redress for pregnant workers.  But that question too presents a false 
choice.  Instead of an either/or choice, the question that should be asked in light 
of the new disability/pregnancy scholarship is a more modest one: is there 
anything to be gained by continuing to fight these battles under the PDA, or 
should all energies from this point forward be channeled into theorizing and 
interpreting the ADA?  In our view, we should not give up on the PDA, even as 
we applaud those scholars pressing forward with new arguments for covering 
pregnancy under the ADA. 
 
 318. Id. at 448-50 (arguing that feminists’ objections to treating pregnancy as a disability because 
“it represents heightened rather than diminished biological functioning” is “startlingly similar to the 
Gilbert Court’s rationale for distinguishing pregnancy and disability”). 
 319. Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the 
ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1 (2012) (examining why pregnancy has 
been excluded from coverage as a disability under the ADA). 
 320. Id. at 9-12. 
 321. For background on the split in the feminist movement, and argument on how to resolve it, 
see generally Krieger & Cooney, supra note 68. 
 322. See Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 67, at 170 (“If we can’t have it both ways, we need 
to think carefully about which way we want to have it.”)  Over time, the “if” in that sentence has been 
treated as “because.” 
 323. See California Federal Savings v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
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The new scholarship on pregnancy as disability is persuasive in showing 
how the social model of disability responds to feminist concerns that analogizing 
pregnancy to disability fails to recognize the distinctly positive and healthy 
aspects of pregnancy.  The social model of disability refuses to see the body as 
either inherently able or disabled, and instead focuses on how the body interacts 
with the work environment, as currently structured, and the effect on job 
capacity.  This reframing of disability away from a medical, pathological 
approach is in synch with feminist desires to recognize pregnancy as something 
that is often (although not always) experienced as a positive in women’s lives, 
and as a distinctive ability of women’s bodies, even as pregnancy (sometimes, but 
not always) affects a woman’s work capacity. 
However, situating pregnancy only under the social model of disability, 
without attention to sex equality, would miss something fundamental to 
pregnancy and its relationship to work that is distinctively gendered.  First, even 
insofar as pregnancy discrimination is a reaction to the pregnant body, such 
negative reactions are specific to the gendered female body.  The pregnant body 
can trigger a range of reactions, both positive and negative.  The negative ones 
include fear and disgust at women’s reproductive processes that are viewed as 
messy, leaky, intrusive, repulsive, unpredictable and out of control.324  Negative 
reactions to the pregnant body are not necessarily analogous to negative 
reactions to other disabling conditions that can affect both men and women.325  
The negative reaction to pregnant bodies in the workplace is a reaction to the 
distinctively female reproductive process and the accompanying changes that are 
specific to women’s bodies.326 
More importantly, pregnancy discrimination is not just, or even primarily, a 
reaction to the pregnant body or the body’s interaction with the work 
environment: there is an ideology about gender roles that is specific to pregnancy 
and work.  As discussed above, like other gender ideologies, the gender ideology 
behind pregnancy discrimination is race- and class- specific and affects women 
in different ways. 
For women whose fertility is highly socially valued—especially married, 
white, professional women—the gender ideology behind pregnancy 
discrimination marginalizes women’s work contributions in relation to their 
maternal roles.  Such women risk being seen as less valuable workers because 
they presumptively are (or should be) more attached to their maternal roles, and 
hence are seen as at greater risk of stepping off of the career ladder. 
 
 324. See Caroline Gatrell, Policy and the Pregnant Body at Work: Strategies of Secrecy, Silence and 
Supra-Performance, 18 GENDER, WORK AND ORG. 158, 174-77 (2011). 
 325. Cf. Halpert, supra note 241, at 658 (“it is unknown whether the voluntary nature of most 
pregnancies results in perceptions of and behaviors toward pregnant women that differ from 
attitudes about employees with involuntary disabilities”). 
 326. See Gattrell, supra note 245, at 97, 107 (citing research “observ[ing] how, in the context of 
management and organization, women’s maternal ‘bodies. . .their ability to procreate, their 
pregnancy, breastfeeding and childcare. . .are [treated as] suspect, stigmatized and used as grounds 
for control and exclusion’” and citing literature contending that “organizational antipathy to 
breastfeeding is due to employers’ deep-seated fears about women’s bodies, which they regard as 
unreliable and unpredictable in a way which does not apply to the bodies of men or to non-
mothers”). 
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For women whose fertility is less socially valued—especially women of 
color, unmarried women, and lower- and working-class women—it is not a 
chivalrous gender ideology that prioritizes motherhood over work, but one 
casting them as unreliable, fungible workers undeserving of accommodations.  
Women of color have never fit into the cult of motherhood that pampers 
pregnant women and values them as mothers-to-be.  The many African 
American women slaves who worked in the fields until they gave birth, only to 
return to forced labor the next day, provide a stark historic illustration of the 
racial specificity of the gender ideologies that animate refusals to accommodate 
pregnant women workers. 
Although the gender ideologies of pregnancy discrimination are plural 
rather than monolithic, there is nonetheless a distinctively gendered (both 
prescriptive and descriptive) stereotyping involved in pregnancy discrimination. 
Pregnancy does not just involve the body, even when taking a broad view of the 
social body; it is also a condition that triggers gender role-typing, replete with 
presumed and prescribed notions about women’s proper roles at work and in the 
family.  To make this point is not at all to deny that there is also an ideology 
about disabled workers that underlies disability discrimination—one that 
devalues the contributions and worth of people who are labeled disabled and 
sorts them into roles defined by this construction.  Certain aspects of these 
ideologies—about both pregnancy and disability—surely overlap, in that a 
condition of the body is used to define a person’s worth and proper roles.  
Nevertheless, it is not primarily the bodily condition of pregnancy that defines 
and limits women’s roles, but the gendered future that it signals for women 
when that bodily condition ceases.  Every pregnancy has an endpoint, whether 
by miscarriage, termination, or childbirth.  Even with that endpoint in sight, 
pregnancy is a marker of a woman’s future.  Assumptions about the pregnant 
woman’s future—assumptions relating to her presumed and prescribed maternal 
roles vis-à-vis work—have historically shaped the treatment of pregnant women 
at work and continue to do so today.327  When that treatment forces pregnant 
women out of jobs, it reinforces gendered expectations about women’s work and 
reproductive lives.328 
To be clear, the point here is not that pregnancy should not be seen as a 
disability that is covered under the ADA.  We are persuaded both by the social 
model of disability and by the argument that this model encompasses pregnancy.  
Rather, our point is a more nuanced one: in addition to pushing back against the 
exclusion of pregnancy from the ADA, it is also important to reclaim the PDA as 
a viable remedy for pregnancy-based discrimination at work.  Pregnancy 
discrimination is a distinctively gendered phenomenon—not just because of the 
 
 327. See McDonald, Expecting the Worst, supra note 310 at 230 (discussing psychological literature 
from the 1950’s pathologizing maternal employment); see also NAT’L P’SHIP OF WOMEN & FAMILIES, 
Expecting Better: A State-by-State Analysis of Laws that Help New Parents (May 2012) (discussing 
workers’ rights under current state laws and the strides states have made in promoting economic 
security of new parents). 
 328. Cf. Rosenblum, supra note 315, at 66 (“The market is also sexed: the perception that ‘mothers’ 
are primarily responsible for children persists in part because of the continued domination of men in 
the market context.”); STEPHANIE COONTZ, MYTH OF THE OPT-OUT MOM, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 
IN THE UNITED STATES; AN INTEGRATED STUDY 473, 473-75.(7th ed. 2006). 
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biological reality that only women’s bodies become pregnant, but also because of 
the gender ideologies about women, work, and maternity that underlie it.  
Pregnancy discrimination is an integral block in the edifice of women’s 
subordination, and we would lose something important by giving up on the 
promise of sex equality law to adequately account for pregnancy.  And yet, 
specifying what that “something important” is is the part of our argument that is 
the most difficult to articulate.  If litigating under the ADA works for pregnant 
plaintiffs, why keep up the fight under the PDA?  We believe that there is 
something valuable in making a sex equality challenge to the barriers 
confronting pregnant women at work, even if it is not so easy to articulate what 
that something is.  We sketch out below our (still developing) thoughts about 
what, exactly, this might be. 
Various voices in the academy have questioned the value of continuing to 
work with feminism and feminist legal strategies as a vehicle for addressing the 
problems in women’s lives.  Janet Halley has famously urged taking a “break” 
from feminism.329  More recently, Marc Spindelman has asked whether the 
substantive tenets of feminist legal theory might be brought to bear on legal 
problems without specifically using feminism, per se, to get there.330  Professor 
Spindelman’s thesis is specific to the continuing viability of feminist legal theory, 
which is not the same thing as the question of whether to reinvigorate a feminist-
inspired sex discrimination law like the PDA, or abandon it in favor of a non-
gender specific law.  Nevertheless, a decision to use the ADA as the vehicle for 
accommodating pregnancy at work, rather than the PDA, might be a practical 
application of proposals like Professor Spindelman’s for moving away from 
explicitly feminist legal strategies.  As Professor Spindelman points out, 
disability feminists have been “doing” feminism in substance if not in name for 
some time now.331  We are intrigued by this possibility, but not fully persuaded, 
at least with respect to the practical question of whether we can completely “get 
there” under the ADA while giving up on the PDA. 
The seeds of a response are found in Professor Spindelman’s essay.  Law is 
indeed “both a repository and an important site in the construction of culture 
and cultural values.”332  Framing the treatment of pregnant workers as an issue 
of women’s equality brings with it a specific history of struggle that occupies a 
central place within the broader movement for women’s equality. As the 
American Civil Liberties Union put it, in a 1985 policy statement: “Pregnancy, or 
the capacity to become pregnant, is the single most pervasive factor in the history 
of sex discrimination.”333  If this at all overstates the importance of pregnancy 
discrimination to the history of the women’s rights movement, it is not by much.  
The history behind the PDA, specifically, reflects a broad-based movement for 
women’s equality that has transformative implications for how work is 
structured in relation to women’s lives.  Deborah Dinner has shown that the 
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history behind the PDA involves a much broader-based feminist agenda for sex 
equality than has been commonly appreciated.334  More than a push for similar 
treatment for pregnant workers, the grass-roots feminist movement behind the 
PDA sought to redistribute the social costs of motherhood and unravel the male 
breadwinner/family wage structure of work and family.335  Decades of litigation 
under the PDA have helped deepen public understanding of the gender 
stereotyping behind the treatment of pregnancy.336  The struggle for sex equality 
rights for pregnant workers continues to mobilize the movement for women’s 
equality.  For example, Patricia Shiu and Stephanie Wildman detail how the 
passage of the PDA and the struggles within the feminist movement over its 
proper construction galvanized the social movement that ultimately succeeded 
in getting California to enact the first state law to require paid leave in the U.S.337  
Continuing to highlight the problems facing pregnant workers, and linking them 
to the broader agenda for women’s equality, can help resist de-politicized 
narratives of a purportedly post-feminist, post-sexist era. 
Conversely, completely submerging pregnancy in the gender-neutral frame 
of disability risks obscuring the sex inequality that comes from the refusal to 
accommodate pregnant workers.  A recent article by Jessica Clarke describes the 
risks of universalizing sex equality claims in the guise of gender-neutrality.338  
These risks include promoting “the myth of neutrality” by assimilating sex 
inequality into gender-neutral injustices and draining support for more targeted 
approaches to remedying gender inequality.339  As feminist scholars have long 
taught, gender-neutral baselines often mask deep structures of gender 
inequality.340  We should not lose sight of the fact that refusing to accommodate 
pregnant workers further entrenches gender inequality in the workplace. 
Despite the, at times, one-step forward, two-steps backward agony of 
working in sex equality law, and the perpetual risk of backlash, we are not ready 
to “close up shop” or “go entirely out of business”341 in the search for specifically 
feminist legal theories to restructure work to accommodate pregnant workers.  
There is an emotional and cultural resonance to labeling the unjust treatment of 
pregnant women in the workplace as a gendered inequality, a form of sex 
discrimination, even while recognizing that it may also be regarded as disability 
discrimination.  Labeling and defining the poor treatment of pregnant workers as 
sex-based discrimination can build solidarity among women and illuminate 
connections with other, related ways that women are subordinated at work, even 
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while simultaneously acknowledging it as disability discrimination can build 
bridges and coalitions between social movements for gender justice and justice 
for persons with disabilities.342 
Sidestepping the PDA and putting all our litigation eggs in the ADA basket 
is not likely to avoid a backlash to efforts to protect the rights of pregnant 
workers.343  Certainly, the ADA has been targeted for more than its share of 
backlash.344  Bringing the rights of pregnant workers into the broader fold of the 
ADA will not defuse the clash of gender ideologies at the heart of these 
disputes.345  To cite just one example, dressing the new mandate for insurance 
coverage of prescription contraceptives in the gender-neutral clothes of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not mitigate the clash of gender 
ideologies behind opposition to that expansion.346  Without a doubt, advocates 
for pregnant workers’ rights will still need effective strategies for dealing with 
backlash in the gender culture wars, regardless of whether legal claims are 
asserted under the ADA, the PDA or both. 
Pressing forward with rights under the PDA may help promote a broader 
agenda for sex discrimination law. There are doctrinal connections between the 
PDA’s current stingy approach to pregnancy discrimination and discrimination 
law’s inadequate treatment of sex discrimination generally.  If pregnancy is 
farmed out entirely to the ADA without fighting these battles under the PDA, the 
problematic rifts in Title VII doctrine that have cut short the statute’s promise 
may become more solidified.  For example, Michael Selmi has pointed out that 
courts’ vision of what a nondiscriminatory world looks like, and of what 
discrimination looks like, shapes how courts apply the intent requirement when 
searching for intentional discrimination.347  The stereotype that pregnancy is a 
trigger point that reduces women’s attachment to the labor force sets the stage 
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for judges to expect that a non-discriminatory employer would deny 
accommodations for a rational business reason rather than a discriminatory one.  
Beliefs about women’s “choices” to opt out of the paid labor force, and about 
whether pregnant women deserve accommodations if they choose to remain at 
work, provide tempting alternative explanations besides discrimination that 
appeal to some judges.  Dismantling the gender ideologies that create such 
expectations might be aided by situating the struggle in the social and historic 
movement for women’s equality.  Stereotypes related to pregnancy are integral 
to the culture wars over “choice,” “opt-out” and the lingering societal 
ambivalence about working mothers.  Although the ADA may get women 
litigants to the same place in the end, there is still value in continuing to fight 
pregnancy discrimination under the rubric of sex equality, even as feminist 
litigators also embrace the movement to link pregnancy and disability.  There is 
nothing to be gained by choosing sides, and much to lose by conceding these 
battles under the PDA. 
Finally, retaining a sex equality right connects pregnancy to other legal and 
social issues central to women’s equality.  The treatment of pregnancy at work is 
just one of the issues women face in seeking to integrate multiple aspects of their 
reproductive and family lives in a work world designed for an implicitly male 
ideal worker.  There are a range of “accommodations” women may need to 
combine their reproductive lives with their work lives, including access to 
contraception, access to and time off for assisted reproduction technologies, and 
breaks for breastfeeding/lactation.  Giving up on pregnancy as a sex 
discrimination claim does not bode well for these issues, which are unlikely to 
get ADA coverage.  Nor does it bode well for the sex equality argument for 
reproductive choice to terminate a pregnancy, an argument that has gained 
traction since the Supreme Court’s Casey decision.348  The precariousness of the 
privacy right for abortion necessitates continuing feminist efforts to ground the 
right in sex equality, even as theorists and litigators continue to explore new 
possibilities for securing a woman’s right to self-determination.349  In addition, 
the broader movement for reproductive justice encompasses a wide range of 
practices that interfere with women’s reproductive freedoms, including the 
freedom to become a mother.  Early cases challenging the treatment of pregnant 
workers linked together arguments sounding in reproductive autonomy and 
gender subordination.350  By litigating pregnant worker’s rights under the PDA, 
the connections between women’s workplace equality and women’s 
reproductive choices can be illuminated.  Rather than give up on the PDA, we 
should reclaim it as a crucial law in the broader movement for reproductive 
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justice.351  The goal of securing women’s rights in the workplace is inextricably 
connected to the struggle for reproductive justice.352 
In short, more is at stake in abandoning a sex discrimination claim for 
pregnancy discrimination than the treatment of pregnant workers per se.  Battles 
over pregnancy and reproduction have played a central role in the social and 
legal struggles over women’s equality.  While feminist legal strategists should 
pursue all available avenues to secure justice for pregnant workers, and build 
bridges and broad coalitions in this pursuit, we should not abandon specifically 
feminist claims for gender justice with regard to pregnancy.  While the ADA 
could and should play a useful role in protecting pregnant workers too, there 
remains value in using a sex equality framework as a foundation to link the 
broader movements to secure reproductive justice and women’s workplace 
equality. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems with the PDA identified in this article could be fixed as they 
have been created, through judicial interpretation.353  Ideally, the lower courts 
would simply follow the Supreme Court’s directive in Johnson Controls to “do no 
more than hold that the PDA means what it says.”354  Recent trends in the PDA 
case law, however, are not encouraging. 
In the thirty-five years since the PDA’s enactment, lower courts appear to 
have missed the lessons of Congress’ rejection of Gilbert and Geduldig.  In those 
cases, the Court allowed pregnancy to be siphoned off in a class by itself when it 
came to extending employment benefits to workers in need of them.  Treating 
pregnancy as a distinctive condition unique to women—and a voluntary one at 
that, for which women themselves would be responsible—the Court placed the 
work-related costs of pregnancy and childbirth on women alone.  The PDA 
resoundingly rejected that philosophy, recognizing that for work-related 
purposes, pregnancy should be treated no worse than any other condition that 
impairs employees’ work ability to a similar extent. 
As employers have gradually—and at times begrudgingly—done more for 
other conditions, such as on-the-job injuries and disabilities covered by the 
ADA—the PDA should have extended the same treatment to pregnant workers.  
Instead, courts have allowed employers to deny pregnancy the same 
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accommodations and benefits, as long as they do not detect a pregnancy-based 
animus as the reason for doing so.  Through reading clause one as protecting 
only the status of pregnancy and not its effects, and especially by reading clause 
two as barring only those failures to accommodate that can be traced to proof of 
pregnancy-based animus, courts have made the PDA increasingly irrelevant to 
working women. 
This article has argued that there is a gender stereotyping ideology behind 
pregnancy discrimination, and in particular behind refusals to accommodate 
pregnancy in the workplace, that has survived and thrived in recent years in the 
PDA case law.  However, because it does not register with judges as pregnancy-
based animus, it goes unchecked by the courts. Through their insistence on proof 
of animus in the PDA cases, the courts have failed to recognize that the carving 
out of pregnancy for disfavored treatment is itself based on an ideology of 
stereotyping about women, maternity and work: an ideology that presumes that 
women’s maternity should not be accommodated in the workplace, and that 
women marked by pregnancy and maternity are compromised workers.  
Congress rejected such a gender ideology when it repudiated the Gilbert decision 
and enacted the PDA.355 But gender norms are sticky and ideologies about 
women, maternity and work not easily discarded.  As is often the case when sex 
discrimination law fails, it is the least privileged women—those most in need of 
the law’s protections—who bear the greatest costs. 
 
 
 355. See S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 40 (1977) (Senate committee report on the PDA, observing that “the 
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex 
stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace”); Johnson 
Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (explaining that in passing the PDA, Congress recognized that “[c]oncern for 
a woman’s existing or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for denying women equal 
employment opportunities”). 
